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Bit commitment protocols whose security is based on the laws of quantum mechanics alone are
generally held to be impossible. In this paper we give a strengthened and explicit proof of this result.
We extend its scope to a much larger variety of protocols, which may have an arbitrary number
of rounds, in which both classical and quantum information is exchanged, and which may include
aborts and resets. Moreover, we do not consider the receiver to be bound to a fixed “honest”
strategy, so that “anonymous state protocols”, which were recently suggested as a possible way
to beat the known no-go results are also covered. We show that any concealing protocol allows
the sender to find a cheating strategy, which is universal in the sense that it works against any
strategy of the receiver. Moreover, if the concealing property holds only approximately, the cheat
goes undetected with a high probability, which we explicitly estimate. The proof uses an explicit
formalization of general two party protocols, which is applicable to more general situations, and a
new estimate about the continuity of the Stinespring dilation of a general quantum channel. The
result also provides a natural characterization of protocols that fall outside the standard setting of
unlimited available technology, and thus may allow secure bit commitment. We present a new such
protocol whose security, perhaps surprisingly, relies on decoherence in the receiver’s lab.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
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I. INTRODUCTION
Bit commitment is a cryptographic primitive involving
two mistrustful parties, conventionally called Alice and
Bob. Alice is supposed to submit an encoded bit of in-
formation to Bob in such a way that Bob has (almost)
no chance to identify the bit before Alice later decodes it
for him, whereas Alice has (almost) no way of changing
the value of the bit once she has submitted it: in tech-
nical terms, a good bit commitment protocol should be
simultaneously concealing and binding.
Bit commitment has immediate practical applications,
and is also known to be a very powerful cryptographic
primitive. It was conceived by Blum [1] as a building
block for secure coin tossing. Bit commitment also allows
to implement secure oblivious transfer [2, 3, 4], which in
turn is sufficient to establish secure two-party computa-
tion [5, 6].
A standard example to illustrate bit commitment is for
Alice to write the bit down on a piece of paper, which
is then locked in a safe and sent to Bob, whereas Alice
keeps the key. At a later time, she will unveil by handing
over the key to Bob. However, Bob has a well-equipped
toolbox at home and may have been able to open the
safe in the meantime. So while this scheme may offer
reasonably good practical security, it is in principle inse-
cure. Yet all bit commitment schemes that have wide cur-
rency today rely on such technological constraints: not
on strongboxes and keys, but on unproven assumptions
that certain computations are hard to perform. Several
such protocols have been suggested, either computation-
ally binding [1, 7, 8, 9] or computationally concealing
[10, 11]. Cryptographers have long known that without
such technological constraints, bit commitment (like any
other interesting two-party cryptographic primitive) can-
not be securely implemented in a classical world [5].
It has therefore been a long-time challenge for quan-
tum cryptographers to find unconditionally secure quan-
tum bit commitment protocols, in which — very much in
parallel to quantum key distribution [12, 13] — security
is guaranteed by the laws of quantum physics alone.
A. Quantum Bit Commitment and the No-Go
Theorem
The first quantum bit commitment protocol is due to
Bennett and Brassard and appears in their famous 1984
quantum cryptography paper [12], in a version adapted
to coin tossing. In their scheme, Alice commits to a bit
value by preparing a sequence of photons in either of
two mutually unbiased bases, in a way that the resulting
quantum states are indistinguishable to Bob. The au-
thors show that their protocol is secure against so-called
passive cheating, in which Alice initially commits to the
bit value k, and then tries to unveil 1−k later. However,
they also prove that Alice can cheat with a more sophis-
ticated strategy, in which she initially prepares pairs of
maximally entangled states instead, keeps one particle of
each pair in her lab and sends the second particle to Bob.
It is a direct consequence of the EPR effect that Alice can
then unveil either bit at the opening stage by measuring
her particles in the appropriate basis, and Bob has no
way to detect the difference.
Subsequent proposals for bit commitment schemes
tried to evade this type of attack by forcing the players
to carry out measurements and communicate classically
as they go through the protocol. At a 1993 conference
Brassard, Cre´peau, Jozsa, and Langlois presented a bit
commitment protocol [14] that was claimed and generally
accepted to be unconditionally secure.
In 1996 it was then realized by Lo and Chau [15, 16],
and independently by Mayers [17, 18, 19] that all previ-
ously proposed bit commitment protocols are vulnerable
to a generalized version of the EPR attack that renders
the BB84 proposal insecure, a result they slightly ex-
tended to cover quantum bit commitment protocols in
general. In essence, their proof goes as follows: At the
end of the commitment phase, Bob will hold one out of
two quantum states ̺k as proof of Alice’s commitment
to the bit value k ∈ {0, 1}. Alice holds its purification
ψk, which she will later pass on to Bob to unveil. For
the protocol to be concealing, the two states ̺k should
be (almost) indistinguishable, ̺0 ≈ ̺1. But Uhlmann’s
theorem [20, 21] then implies the existence of a unitary
transformation U that (nearly) rotates the purification
of ̺0 into the purification of ̺1. Since U is localized on
the purifying system only, which is entirely under Alice’s
control, Lo-Chau-Mayers argue that Alice can switch at
will back and forth between the two states, and is not in
any way bound to her commitment. As a consequence,
any concealing bit commitment protocol is argued to be
necessarily non-binding.
These results still hold true when both players are re-
stricted by superselection rules [22]. So while the pro-
posed quantum bit commitment protocols offer good
practical security on the grounds that Alice’s EPR attack
is hard to perform with current technology, none of them
is unconditionally secure. Spekkens and Rudolph [23] ex-
tended the no-go theorem by providing explicit bounds
on the degree of concealment and bindingness that can be
achieved simultaneously in any bit commitment protocol,
some of which they showed can be saturated.
B. Two Camps
In view of these negative results, subsequent research
has primarily focused on bit commitment under plausi-
3ble technological constraints, such as a limited classical
[24, 25] or quantum [26] memory, or the difficulty of per-
forming collective measurements [27]. In an alternative
approach, researchers have slightly modified the standard
setting to evade the no-go theorem: Kent [28, 29] has
shown that relativistic signalling constraints may facili-
tate secure bit commitment when Alice and Bob each run
two labs a (large) distance apart and security is main-
tained through a continual exchange of messages. A dif-
ferent variant was introduced by Hardy and Kent [30],
and independently by Aharonov et al. [31]: in cheat-
sensitive bit commitment protocols, both players may
have the chance to cheat, but face the risk of their fraud
being detected by the adversary. Building on Kent’s orig-
inal proposal [32], the tradeoff between bindingness and
concealment in quantum string commitment protocols
has recently been investigated [33, 34, 35].
At the same time, the Lo-Chau-Mayers no-go theorem
[15, 18] is continually being challenged. Yuen and oth-
ers have repeatedly expressed doubts in Mayer’s opaque
paper [18], arguing that the no-go proof is not gen-
eral enough to exclude all conceivable quantum bit com-
mitment protocols. Several protocols have been pro-
posed and claimed to circumvent the no-go theorem (see
[36, 37, 38, 39, 40] and references therein, as well as this
account [41, 42] of the controversy). These protocols seek
to strengthen Bob’s position with the help of ‘secret pa-
rameters’ or ‘anonymous states’, so that Alice lacks some
information to cheat successfully: while Uhlmann’s theo-
rem would still imply the existence of a unitary cheating
transformation as described above, this transformation
might be unknown to Alice.
Two camps seem to have formed, a large one compris-
ing most of the community, in which the impossibility of
quantum bit commitment is accepted on the basis of the
Lo-Chau-Mayers proof, and a smaller group of sceptics,
which is not convinced, even though no provably secure
protocol, and hence a counterexample to the no-go result,
has surfaced so far.
It appears that much of this controversy stems from
slightly differing approaches to the problem. A good way
to pinpoint the basic disagreement is Kerckhoffs’ princi-
ple, which goes back to the 19th century military cryp-
tographer Auguste Kerckhoffs and is now universally em-
braced by cryptographers [43, 44]. The principle states
that the security of a cryptographic protocol should not
rely on keeping parts of the algorithm secret. In the
words of Bruce Schneier, “every secret creates a poten-
tial failure point. Secrecy, in other words, is a prime
cause of brittleness — and therefore something likely to
make a system prone to catastrophic collapse” [45]. In
this respect every secret parameter chosen by the human
in a cryptographic protocol — e. g. a password — is
regarded as a potential weakness. For this reason cryp-
tographers usually think of their algorithms as being ex-
ecuted by machines, whose blueprints can be published
without jeopardizing the security of the system.
Anonymous states and other secret parameters used
in Yuen’s protocols are apparently regarded as a viola-
tion of Kerckhoffs’ principle, which suggests a restriction
to fixed and automatizable strategies for both players.
Deviations from these strategies are considered an at-
tempted fraud. The Kerckhoffian security analysis then
does not hold any provisions for the case in which both
parties deviate from their ‘honest’ strategies. Therefore
Lo-Chau-Mayers only consider the final committed state
given that Bob sticks to his publicly known strategy, since
Alice’s cheat only has to work against this strategy. So
while Kerckhoffs’ principle is certainly high on the list
of desiderata for cryptographic protocols, it appears that
Lo-Chau-Mayers only show that there is no bit commit-
ment protocol satisfying Kerckhoffs’ principle, whereas
the next best thing, e.g., an anonymous state protocol
might still exist.
Another possible origin for disagreement is the style of
Mayers’s paper [18], along the lines of Mark Kac’s dic-
tum “A demonstration convinces a reasonable man; a
proof convinces a stubborn man”1. In this sense, i.e., ac-
cording to the standards of “stubborn” mathematics or
mathematical physics, Mayers gives merely a demonstra-
tion. Since the argument against Kerckhoffian protocols
only involves the state directly after commitment, May-
ers declares it irrelevant to formalize the class of two-
party protocols, even though an insufficiently specified
domain usually leaves a no-go “theorem” rather fuzzy.
Other aspects of the problem (e.g. the use of classical
and quantum information together) get a similarly rough
treatment. This may be a symptom of the “Four Page
Pest”2. In any case, it appeared to us high time to con-
vince ourselves, and hopefully some other stubborn men,
of the exact scope and status of the No Bit Commitment
statements.
C. A Stronger No-Go Theorem: Overview and
Outline
In this contribution we propose to resolve the bit com-
mitment controversy with a strengthened no-go theorem.
We will give a precise description of general two-party
protocols, which we hope no longer shows the hard work
of keeping it fully explicit but still notationally manage-
able. This description should also be helpful for ana-
lyzing protocols for other tasks, involving any number
of parties. Our description of bit commitment does not
assume Kerckhoffs’ principle, so that Bob is not honor
bound to a particular course of action. Nevertheless, we
show that any concealing protocol allows Alice a uni-
1 Cited after N. D. Mermin: Exact Lower Bounds for Some Equi-
librium Properties of a Classical One-Component Plasma, Phys.
Rev. 171 (1968) 272, footnote 2.
2 I.e., the disease of cramming an argument onto four pages in
PRL format, although its shortest intelligible presentation re-
quires more than six.
4versal cheating strategy, working against all strategies
of Bob simultaneously. Moreover, our result is stable
against small errors, in the sense that nearly conceal-
ing protocols allow a nearly perfect cheat, with explicit
universal error bounds. The result is based on a continu-
ity theorem for Stinespring’s representation [46], which
generalizes Uhlmann’s theorem from quantum states to
channels.
Our proof includes a full treatment of classical and
quantum information flow and also covers aborts and re-
sets. It applies to bit commitment protocols with any
(finite or infinite) number of rounds during each the com-
mitment, holding, and opening phase. We only require
that the expected number of rounds is finite. More-
over, the proof is not restricted to quantum systems on
finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. The strengthened no-
go theorem shows the insecurity of all recently proposed
bit commitment protocols [36, 37, 38, 39, 40]. A pre-
liminary version of the proof, restricted to single-round
commitments, has appeared in [47]. Our results gen-
eralize that of Ozawa [48] and recent work by Cheung
[49], who showed that Alice can still cheat in protocols
with secret parameters for the simpler case of perfect
concealment, and without a full reduction. Cheung’s es-
timates [50] for approximately concealing protocols de-
pend on the dimensions of the underlying Hilbert space,
and hence cannot rule out bit commitment protocols with
high-dimensional or infinite-dimensional systems.
We also classify those protocols that fall outside the
standard setting, and thus may allow secure bit commit-
ment. We propose a new such bit commitment protocol
whose security— perhaps paradoxically— relies on deco-
herence in Bob’s lab. Interestingly, this protocol explores
a purely quantum-mechanical effect: the distinction be-
tween the local erasure of information and the destruc-
tion of quantum correlations [55]. Well-known classical
bit commitment protocols whose security relies on noisy
communication channels are briefly reviewed, too.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II we
give a detailed description of the setup for quantum bit
commitment protocols, and list important types of pro-
tocols that fall within our definition. This will serve
to specify the domain for the proof of the strengthened
no-go theorem, which is then presented in Section III.
In Section IV we briefly describe how to extend the
no-go theorem to quantum bit commitment protocols
in infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces or with infinitely
many rounds. Section V investigates provably secure bit
commitment protocols whose security is built on deco-
herence in either Alice’s or Bob’s lab, or in the transmis-
sion line. We conclude with a Summary and Discussion
in Sec. VI. An appendix contains the necessary back-
ground on quantum states and channels, direct sums and
quantum-classical hybrid systems.
II. THE SETUP
In this section we describe the task of quantum bit
commitment, and define what a successful bit commit-
ment protocol would have to achieve. We have attempted
not to exclude any possibilities, and have avoided all sim-
plifications “without loss of generality” at this stage. In
this way we hope to separate, more clearly than our pre-
decessors, the definition of bit commitment to which the
statement “Bit commitment is impossible” refers and, on
the other hand, the simplifications which we will make in
the course of the proof of this statement.
The analysis will be based solely on the principles
of quantum mechanics, including classical physics. We
do not consider relativistic signalling constraints, which
are known to facilitate secure bit commitment [28, 29].
For ease of presentation, we initially impose as a finite-
ness condition, that all classical messages can only take
finitely many values, that all quantum systems can be
described in a finite dimensional Hilbert space, and that
the total number of messages exchanged is uniformly
bounded. These constraints will then be relaxed in
Sec. IV.
A. Description in Plain English
The Basic Task — Bit Commitment is a crypto-
graphic primitive involving two mistrustful parties, con-
ventionally called Alice and Bob. Alice is supposed to
submit an encoded bit of information to Bob in such a
way that Bob has (almost) no chance to identify the bit
before Alice decodes it for him, and Alice has (almost)
no way of changing the value of the bit after she has sub-
mitted it. In other words, Bob is interested in binding
Alice to some commitment, whereas Alice would like to
conceal her commitment from Bob.
Protocols and Strategies — A protocol first of all
regulates the exchange of messages between Alice and
Bob, such that at every stage it is clear what type of
message is expected from the participants, although, of
course, their content is not fixed. The expected message
types can be either classical or quantum or a combina-
tion thereof, with the number of distinguishable classi-
cal signals and the dimension of the Hilbert spaces fixed.
The type of messages can depend on classical information
generated previously. The collection of all these instruc-
tions will be called the communication interface of the
protocol.
A particular plan for operating a local laboratory to
supply the required messages, is called a strategy. A
strategy could determine that some message sent is ob-
tained from a measurement on a system available in the
local lab, but it could also specify the arbitrary invention
of a classical value to be sent and the fresh preparation of
an accompanying quantum system. We typically denote
Alice’s strategy by a and Bob’s by b.
5The second key element of the protocol specifies defi-
nite procedures for Alice to follow if she wants to commit
the bit values 0 or 1, respectively. These special honest
strategies will be denoted by a0 and a1.
Phases of the Protocol — In any commitment
scheme, we can distinguish three phases. The first is the
commitment phase, in which Alice and Bob start from
some (publicly known and trusted) shared quantum or
classical state and go through a possibly complicated ex-
change of classical and quantum messages. By definition,
at the end of this phase, the bit value is considered to be
committed to Bob but, supposedly, concealed from him.
Alice and Bob then might split up for a while, with-
out further communication. In this holding phase typi-
cally only local operations are possible, i.e., Bob might
attempt to read the committed bit, and Alice might at-
tempt to prepare a cheat.
Finally they get in touch again to open the commit-
ment. In the opening phase, Alice sends to Bob some
classical or quantum information to reveal her commit-
ment. Taking both Alice’s message and his own (classical
and quantum) records, Bob will then perform a suitable
verification measurement. His measurement will result
in either the bit value k ∈ {0, 1}, indicating a successful
commitment, or in a failure symbol “not ok”, indicating
an attempted cheat or abort.
A typical opening consists in Alice sending to Bob the
value of the bit she claims to have committed, together
will all the classical or quantum information needed for
Bob to check this claim against his records. The protocol
might also be ended in a public opening, which requires
Alice and Bob to meet, bringing with them all quantum
and classical systems in their possession, explaining what
strategies they were using, and allowing Bob to choose
arbitrary measurements on all these systems to verify,
with Alice staying on to watch. That is, no possibil-
ity of cheating, withholding information, or making false
claims about the outcome of verification exists in a public
opening.
Conditions on Successful Protocols —We assume
that Alice’s strategies a0 and a1 can be distinguished with
high probability by Bob’s verification measurement: if
Alice honestly played ak, then Bob’s measurement will
result in the bit value k with probability ≥ (1 − η) for
some (small) η ≥ 0. We call such a protocol η-verifiable,
or η-sound. Since this condition depends only on the
honest strategies, it is very easy to satisfy.
We call a protocol ε-concealing, if Alice’s honest strate-
gies cannot be distinguished by Bob (up to an error ε)
before she opens the commitment. In general, of course,
the probabilities he measures while applying his protocol
b depend on whether Alice chooses a0 or a1. Here we
require that no matter what strategy b Bob uses and no
matter what measurement he makes, these probabilities
never differ by more than ε throughout the commitment
and holding phase. Note that the concealing condition
makes no statement whatsoever about other strategies
of Alice. If Alice cheats, there is usually nothing to be
concealed anyway.
A δ-cheating strategy for Alice is a pair of strategies
a♯0 and a
♯
1 such that Bob cannot distinguish a0 from a
♯
0,
and a1 from a
♯
1 better than with a probability difference
δ, at any time, including the opening phase. Of course,
these conditions would be trivially satisfied for a0 = a
♯
0
and a1 = a
♯
1. What makes (a
♯
0, a
♯
1) cheating strategies is
that Alice does not actually make the decision about the
value of the bit until after the commitment phase. That
is, the strategies a♯0 and a
♯
1 must be the same throughout
the commitment phase, and can only differ by local oper-
ations carried out in the holding or opening phase. Note,
however, that Alice might have to decide from the outset
that she wants to cheat, since the strategies a♯i might be
quite different from both a0 and a1. Fig. 1 illustrates Al-
ice’s basic choices as she goes through the protocol. If no
δ-cheating strategy exists for Alice, we call the protocol
δ-binding.
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FIG. 1: Alice’s basic strategic choices. Decisions she must
take are indicated by diamonds, some actions necessary for
a typical cheating strategy by squares. The cheating strategies
a
♯
0 and a
♯
1 are identical throughout the commitment phase, and
might be equal to a purification of the honest strategy a0. Then
U indicates a unitary cheating transformation, and D the in-
troduction of suitable decoherence to reverse purification. In
the opening phase the cheating strategies are identical to their
honest counterparts.
The condition we impose here is much stronger than
the condition that Bob’s standard verification measure-
ments are fooled by the cheat (perhaps with a bound
on the success probability): We require that no measure-
ment whatsoever could detect a difference. With a public
opening rule one could even say that after the cheat not
even Alice herself could help Bob to tell the difference.
Clearly, these conditions make it very hard for Alice to
cheat. Therefore, our proof that Alice can still cheat un-
der such conditions automatically includes all protocols
with weaker conditions on successful cheats.
Real Time Checks for Cheating — It is perhaps
6helpful to point out the difference between two kinds of
checks on Alice’s honesty, which Bob might perform. We
have granted him unlimited technological power in the
definition of ε-concealing. But for running the protocol
no such fantastic abilities are required, and he will not
actually do all those complicated tests. In fact, the con-
cealing and binding properties of the protocol cannot be
ascertained by any practical tests, but are there to be
checked theoretically by Alice and Bob on the basis of
the publicly available description of the protocol. It is
on the basis of such considerations that Alice and Bob
will consent to use the protocol in the first place.
During a single run of the protocol, Bob can employ
some tests on Alice’s behavior as part of the protocol. If
Bob suspects a problem he may be entitled to calling an
abort of the protocol (clearly a classical message), and
the procedure would start at the beginning. The total
number of such resets must be limited on the grounds of
bounding Alice’s probability of cheating. The possibility
of such checks at run-time is the main reason why we
must consider protocols with a large number of rounds,
possibly differing from run to run.
Result — We will prove in Sec. IIIG that any proto-
col which is ε-concealing allows a δ-cheating strategy for
Alice, where δ ≤ 2√ε. These bounds coincide with those
obtained by Spekkens and Rudolph [23] in the Kerckhof-
fian setting.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, Alice’s cheating strategy a♯
consists in playing a purification of the honest strategy
a0 throughout the commitment and holding phase. If
she then opts for the bit value k = 1 instead, she will
apply a unitary operation U on the purifying system,
and thenceforth follow the honest strategy a1.
B. Formal Description of Protocols
In this section we will cast the above description more
explicitly into the formalism of quantum theory. Thereby
we further reduce possible ambiguities in the statement of
the problem, but also prepare the notation for the proof.
The basic formalism of quantum theory is briefly re-
viewed in the Appendix. We will generally identify sys-
tems by their observable algebras. This has the advan-
tage that combinations of classical and quantum infor-
mation are naturally covered: a quantum system with
Hilbert space H is then represented by the algebra B(H)
of operators on H, and a system characterized by a clas-
sical parameter x, and has Hilbert space Hx in that case
is described by the direct sum
⊕
x B(Hx). A state on
such an algebra is of the form
⊕
x pxρx, and is speci-
fied first by a probability distribution px for the x’s, and
second by a collection of density operators ρx on Hx,
which are used to compute expectations if the value of
the classical parameter is known to be x. Since this for-
malism for handling classical information in protocols is
not generally familiar, we describe it in some more detail
in Appendix A and B.
Many algebras (indexed by the nodes of the communi-
cation tree) will appear in the description of the protocol,
indicating that with each operation the type of quantum
system in the respective lab might change completely. By
choosing the lab algebras large enough this dependence
might be avoided. However, even when the lab systems
remain the same, it is helpful to keep the distinguishing
indices for keeping track of the progress of the protocol.
1. The communication tree
At every stage of the protocol a certain amount of
shared classical information will have accumulated. Clas-
sical information never gets lost, so the stages of the pro-
tocol, together with the currently available classical in-
formation naturally form the nodes of a tree, which we
call the communication tree. An example is depicted in
Fig. 2. Every node x carries the following information:
1. Whose turn is it: Alice’s or Bob’s? This follows
from the position of the node in the tree, when we
assume without loss of generality, that Bob always
starts, and from then turns alternate.
2. What are the classical signals, which might be sent
from this person to the other? The admissible sig-
nals form a finite set Mx by assumption. This set
labels the branches continuing from this node to
successor nodes which we denote by x′ = xm, for
m ∈Mx.
3. For each possible classical signal, what kind of
quantum system is accompanying it? If the clas-
sical message is m, we take its observable algebra
to be Mxm, and assume this to be the full algebra
of d × d-matrices for some d = d(x,m) < ∞. The
value d(x,m) = 1 (≃ no accompanying quantum
system) is a possible choice.
4. Each node x is completely characterized by the
entire history of the classical messages exchanged
between Alice and Bob, i.e., we can write x =
m1m2 · · ·mN .
At every node, we denote the observable algebras of Al-
ice’s and Bob’s laboratories by Ax and Bx, respectively.
These are only partly determined by the communication
interface, and depend on the strategy, which we some-
times emphasize by writing Ax(a) and Bx(b). The de-
scription of the communication step below shows in de-
tail how these algebras develop as one moves along the
communication tree. Let Xc denote the set of nodes at
which a commitment is supposed to be reached. Since
only local operations and the opening phase follow, we
can consider these as the leaves of the communication
tree. The joint observable algebra at that stage is⊕
x∈Xc
Ax(a)⊗ Bx(b) (1)
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FIG. 2: Example of a communication tree. Each node cor-
responds to one history of classical communications, with the
different lines from each node representing a possible classical
signal. The dashed lines represent the holding phase, in which
no communication occurs, followed by the opening move (open
circle) by Alice, and a measurement by Bob.
(see the Appendix for the interpretation of direct sums).
The algebras of Alice and Bob could themselves be direct
sums, representing classical information only available to
Alice and Bob, respectively, but we do not look at this
for the moment.
2. The elementary communication step
Now consider some node x, and assume that it is Al-
ice’s turn (everything holds mutatis mutandis for Bob).
We know that some message m ∈ Mx is expected from
Alice, accompanied by a quantum system with observ-
able algebraMxm. The most general way of doing this is
a quantum operation sending states on Ax to states on⊕
mAxm⊗Mxm. Written in the Heisenberg picture Alice
hence chooses a channel (completely positive normalized
map, cf. Appendix)
Tx(a) :
⊕
m∈Mx
Axm(a)⊗Mxm → Ax(a) (2)
Bxm(b) = Mxm ⊗ Bx(b). (3)
Here we have added a parameter a to Tx, to make it
clear that choosing these channels for all x is precisely
what defines Alice’s strategy. Note that the choice of
the channel includes that of their domain and range al-
gebras. The channel Tx(a), together with the input state
determines the probabilities for the classical outcomesm.
Of course, the channel could be one that simply forces
one of the results. Hence m could equally well be the
result of Alice’s free choice of strategy, or of a measure-
ment on a system she recently obtained from Bob. If m
is found, Alice also splits the output system into a part
Axm(a) which Alice keeps, and the part Mxm she sends
to Bob. This splitting is included in the specification of
Tx(a). That Mxm changes ownership is expressed in the
above equation by including it in Bob’s algebra at the
next round (i.e., Bxm) as a tensor factor. At Bob’s nodes
everything is the same, but since we always order tensor
factors as Alice ⊗ Message ⊗ Bob, the analogues of the
above equations at Bob’s nodes are
Tx(b) :
⊕
m∈Mx
Mxm ⊗ Bxm(b)→ Bx(b) (4)
Axm(a) = Ax(a)⊗Mxm. (5)
3. From commencement to commitment
We assume that Alice and Bob initially share the quan-
tum or classical state ρ0:A0 ⊗ B0 → C. The joint state
ρc(a, b, ρ0) :
⊕
x∈Xc
Ax(a)⊗ Bx(b)→ C (6)
at commitment time is then ρc(a, b, ρ0) = ρ0 ◦ T (a, b),
where
Tc(a, b) :
⊕
x∈Xc
Ax(a)⊗ Bx(b)→ A0 ⊗ B0 (7)
is the direct sum channel that arises from the concatena-
tion of all the elementary step channels Tx(a) and Tx(b)
up to commitment time. Of course, Eq. (7) holds cor-
respondingly for the shared states at all other stages of
the protocol. In particular, the final state ρf (a, b, ρ0)
on which Bob carries out the verification measurement
arises from the initial state ρ0 by means of a quantum
operation
Tf (a, b) :
⊕
x∈Xf
Ax(a)⊗ Bx(b)→ A0 ⊗ B0 (8)
where Xf is the collection of all the leaves of the com-
munication tree. We will assume that the initial state
ρ0:A0 ⊗ B0 → C is known to both Alice and Bob,
and henceforth write ρc(a, b) instead of ρc(a, b, ρ0), and
ρf (a, b) instead of ρf (a, b, ρ0) to streamline the presen-
tation.
4. Can Bob distinguish Alice’s strategies?
In the concealing condition, as well as in the descrip-
tion of cheating strategies, it is important to decide
whether Bob can distinguish two strategies of Alice at
8commitment time. Clearly, this depends only on the re-
striction ρBc (ai, b) of the state ρc(ai, b) to Bob’s labora-
tory, which has observable algebra
⊕
x Bx.
The security criterion given in Sec. II A asks for the
largest probability difference obtainable by Bob. It is
convenient to express this in a trace norm difference: the
largest difference of expectations in “yes-no” experiments
with density matrices ρ1, ρ2 is supF |tr(ρ1 − ρ2)F |, where
F ranges over all so-called effects F with 0 ≤ F ≤ 1.
That is, the largest probability difference is 12 ‖ρ1 − ρ2‖1,
where ‖·‖1 denotes the trace norm. This naturally leads
us to the following definition of concealing protocols and
cheating strategies:
Definition 1 (Concealing)
We say that a protocol with a strategy pair (a0, a1) for
Alice is ε-concealing iff for all strategies b of Bob∥∥ρBc (a0, b)− ρBc (a1, b)∥∥1 ≤ 2 ε . (9)
When this condition holds with ε = 0, we say that the
protocol is perfectly concealing.
Note that one possible measuring strategy for Bob is to
actually make the measurement at an earlier time, record
the result, and send only dummy messages to Alice after-
wards. So saying that two strategies are ε-equivalent at
some stage is the same as saying that they are equivalent
up to that stage of the protocol. Hence the ε-concealing
condition implies the only apparently stronger statement
that at no time during the commitment phase Bob is able
to discriminate the honest commitments better than with
probability ε.
Definition 2 (Cheating)
A pair of strategies (a♯0, a
♯
1) for Alice that coincide until
after the commitment phase is called a δ-cheating strategy
iff ∥∥∥ρBf (a♯i , b)− ρBf (ai, b)∥∥∥
1
≤ 2 δ , (10)
for Alice’s honest strategies (a0, a1), i = 0, 1 and all of
Bob’s strategies b.
Def. 2 requires a cheating strategy to work against all of
Bob’s strategies — not only against some fixed strategy,
as suggested by Kerckhoffs’ Principle. We will show in
Sec. III G that Alice can always find such a universally
good cheating strategy. As explained in the Introduc-
tion, this extends the no-go theorem to protocols relying
on secret parameters or “anonymous states”. If Bob’s
strategy b is supposed to be fixed and publicly known in
Eq. (10), our no-go proof will reduce in essence to the one
obtained previously by Lo-Chau-Mayers [15, 16, 17, 18].
C. Protocols Covered by our Definition
In this section we describe some ideas from the liter-
ature about possible protocols, in increasing complexity.
Of course, none of them are ultimately successful. But
this is in many cases not obvious from the outset, so these
ideas serve well to illustrate the richness of two-party pro-
tocols as formalized in our scheme.
1. The beginning
As explained in the Introduction, the first observation
concerning quantum bit commitment was made in the
classic paper of Bennett and Brassard on quantum cryp-
tography [12]. In this basic scenario the commitment
phase has only one round, in which Alice prepares one
of two orthogonal Bell states ψ0, ψ1 ∈ HA ⊗ HB. These
have the same restriction on Bob’s system, so the proto-
col is perfectly concealing. But they are also connected
by a unitary on Alice’s side (as all maximally entangled
states are), and this unitary constitutes her sneak flip
cheating strategy, which under these circumstances also
works perfectly.
2. Alice sends a state
The natural generalization of this protocol is to replace
the Bell states by arbitrary pure states generated by Alice
[15, 18]. When these have the same restriction on Bob’s
side, they are purifications of the same state, and hence
connected by a partial isometry on Alice’s side, which
serves as a sneak flip operation. A crucial step is now
to go away from perfect concealment (ε = 0 in Eq. (9)),
which seems to have been considered first in [18]. In
this case one has to use a continuity result for purifica-
tions, i.e., that nearby states have nearby purifications.
In other words, one needs an estimate [21] of Uhlmann’s
fidelity (which measures the distance between purifying
vectors), and the trace norm.
3. Classical communication
Classical communication occurs naturally in crypto-
graphic protocols, so it needs to be included in the anal-
ysis. In contrast to some of our predecessors, who choose
a purely quantum description from the outset, we treat
classical information explicitly throughout. In particular,
classical information in the Lo-Chau-Mayers approach
is treated quantum-mechanically and sent over noiseless
quantum channels, while our description explicitly allows
information transfer over classical channels, and thus pro-
vides a natural setting to include purely classical proto-
cols in the analysis.
Cheating becomes harder for Alice if the protocol re-
quires some exchange of classical information, for she
no longer has full control over the purification spaces of
the two commitment states. Roughly speaking, unitaries
which introduce superpositions of states, which belong to
9different classical values already sent to Bob, are forbid-
den. In the formalism introduced above this means that
Alice has to find a cheating unitary for every classical
communication history x.
Mayers’ heuristic paper [18] has some provisions for
this case, by sending classical values to a special quantum
repository in the environment, and effectively coherenti-
fying all classical information. In contrast, in this text
the classical communication flow is treated explicitly, and
in fact emerges naturally as a framework for the descrip-
tion of the protocol. This approach should also prove
helpful in the analysis of other cryptographic tasks.
4. Bob supplies the paper
The protocols so far were characterized by the prop-
erty that Bob really had no strategic choices to make
during the commitment phase. Hence the state at the
end of the commitment phase, written in our scheme as
ρc(a, b), really does not depend on Bob’s strategy b. So
Alice only has to connect the purifications of two states
which are explicitly known to her. Clearly, her task of
finding a clever sneak flip becomes harder if there is a
proper dependence on b. Lo-Chau-Mayers restrict their
analysis to those protocols in which Bob follows a speci-
fied ‘honest’ strategy b⋆, which is assumed to be publicly
known in accordance with Kerckhoffs’ principle. In these
cases, Alice knows how to cheat, and the no-go result
immediately applies.
As explained in the Introduction, we do not require
that Bob follows such a publicly known standard strat-
egy. Alice then indeed has to find a sneak flip working
for all of Bob’s admissible strategies b. The easiest such
protocol begins with Bob sending a system to Alice, in
some state known only to him (in [38] this is called an
anonymous state). The honest strategies require Alice
to encode the bit by using this system in some way and
then returning a committing system to Bob. Effectively
Alice now chooses not a state but a channel to encode her
commitment. The purification idea and Uhlmann fidelity
estimate no longer work for this, so these protocols are
not covered by Lo-Chau-Mayers. Instead, the purifica-
tion construction has to be generalized to the Stinespring
representation of channels, and an appropriate continuity
result has to be shown. This will be done in Section III.
5. A decoherence monster in Bob’s lab
That the idea of states supplied by Bob may intro-
duce interesting new aspects is demonstrated by a sce-
nario which is not a bit commitment protocol in the sense
of this section, because it makes additional assumptions
about things happening in Bob’s lab: Suppose that after
Bob has sent some quantum state to Alice, a Decoherence
Monster (such as the cleaning service) enters his lab, and
all quantum information is destroyed. Only his classical
records survive. That is, he still knows what preparation
he made, but cannot use the entangled records he made
during the preparation. Now suppose that Alice and Bob
can rely on this happening. Then they can design a bit
commitment protocol that works. So, paradoxically, the
monster strengthens Bob’s position, because it weakens
the assumptions about his ability to break the conceal-
ment. Hence one can make protocols which are binding
in the strong sense described above, but concealing only
if we assume that coherence in Bob’s lab is indeed de-
stroyed. We will analyze this possibility in Section VB.
6. Alice can choose more strategies
An apparent generalization would allow Alice to choose
her honest strategy a0 at will from some set A0 of honest
strategies, and a1 from A1. The idea is that now some
a0 ∈ A0 might well be distinguishable from some a1 ∈ A1
for Bob. Concealment under such circumstances means
that Bob, on seeing data compatible with some a0 dur-
ing the commitment or holding phase can never be sure
that they do not come from a certain a1. In other words,
for every a0 ∈ A0 there must be an ε-equivalent strat-
egy a1 ∈ A1. But then, according to our result, Alice
might develop a sneak flip attack on the basis of these
two protocols alone.
7. More communication in the holding phase
In Section II A, we excluded any communication in the
holding phase, and, apart from a single message from Al-
ice to Bob, also in the opening phase. There is, however,
no problem to allow such communication, and some pro-
tocols, like Kent’s protocol using relativistic signal speed
constraints [28, 29], require a lot of communication in the
holding phase.
Of course, protocols with no rounds at all in the hold-
ing phase are directly covered by our definition. The
only strategic difference between holding and commit-
ment phase is that Alice’s cheating strategies a♯0 and
a♯1 are only required to coincide during the commitment
phase. She might start cheating with different tricks for
0 and 1 during the holding phase.
Clearly, declaring the holding phase a part of the com-
mitment phase only weakens Alice’s cheating possibility.
However, she does not need these extra options anyway:
a sneak flip attack at the end of the holding phase is
always possible, as we show.
8. Aborts and resets
Often in cryptography one considers protocols which
allow the parties to call an “abort”. We can distinguish
two kinds of abort: when a constructive abort, or reset
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occurs, the protocol is started anew, whereas at a full
abort the whole protocol is terminated as unsuccessful.
Both kinds of aborts are covered in our scheme, but
they would be typical of different phases. Resets are
quite natural in the commitment phase. For example,
Bob might make a test measurement on some message
he receives, and refuses to continue if there is a slight de-
viation from what is expected from Alice playing honest.
A reasonable requirement at this point is that the prob-
ability for reaching a commitment after some number of
rounds with an honest Alice is positive. Then allowing
even more retrials one could bring the probability for
reaching commitment close to one, and allow some arbi-
trary choice in the remaining cases, i.e., if the allotted
total number of rounds is exhausted without a commit-
ment. In this way one would get a protocol satisfying our
finiteness condition, while retaining the potential value of
resets for a commitment protocol. Strictly speaking, re-
sets can only occur during the commitment phase, since
we have demanded a partitioning of each protocol run
into three successive phases (without relapses into ear-
lier phases). However, the holding phase can be essen-
tially united with the commitment phase (see Sec. II C 7).
Hence we can effectively also cover constructive aborts
during the holding phase.
In the opening phase we can consider full, or destruc-
tive aborts. This is a move right to an endpoint of
the communication tree, labelled accordingly. Clearly
this possibility weakens Bob’s discrimination powers, and
makes it much easier to cheat for Alice. In particular,
each sneak flip attack becomes successful. Therefore, the
abort possibility does not seem to present any interest-
ing strategic options for quantum bit commitment. The
proof in Sec. III shows that this is indeed the case.
9. Concatenated protocols
Sometimes one considers settings in which a variety
of different cryptographic protocols are run in parallel
or in succession, usually with dependent inputs. Ob-
taining bounds on the security of concatenated protocols
in terms of the security parameters of their component
parts is often far from straightforward, and a subject
of ongoing research even in classical cryptography [51].
However, in this work we are chiefly concerned with im-
possibility results, which easily transfer to concatenated
protocols: Running a finite number of (possibly differ-
ent) bit commitment protocols in parallel or succession,
and assuming that those protocols all fall into the frame-
work described in this chapter, the concatenated protocol
is again a quantum bit commitment protocol, with suit-
ably enlarged Hilbert and classical messenger spaces and
possibly a larger number of rounds. Since the latter pro-
tocol is covered by our impossibility result, concatenating
finitely many insecure bit commitment protocols cannot
help to establish secure bit commitment.
The formulation of two party protocols that we de-
scribe in Sec. II B is by no means limited to quantum
bit commitment, and hence could also be used to model
larger cryptographic environments, of which quantum bit
commitment might be a subroutine. In Fig. 2, such a pro-
tocol would appear as a subtree. Concealment and bind-
ingness would have to be guaranteed for the entire tree,
and hence by restriction for the subtree. Thus, no two-
party cryptographic protocol covered by the framework
described in Sec. II B can contain a secure bit commit-
ment protocol.
The composability analysis is of course much more in-
volved for secure protocols. The security proof we pro-
vide in Sec. VB for the decoherence monster protocol in
general only applies to the protocol as a stand-alone ob-
ject. If this protocol is then used as a subroutine in a
larger and complicated cryptographic context, the secu-
rity analysis will usually have to be tailored to the specific
protocol. Fortunately, at least the cb-norm estimates we
use in the proof of Th. 12 are stabilized distance mea-
sures, and hence well-behaved under concatenation (cf.
App. C).
III. PROOF
In the exposition of the task of bit commitment and
the admissible protocols we have tried not to restrict
generality by simplifying assumptions, in order not to
weaken the scope of the no-go theorem. This leads to
a rather wild class of strategies to be considered: arbi-
trarily many rounds of communication of varying length,
infinite-dimensional local lab Hilbert spaces, and all that.
Clearly, in the course of the proof we want to get rid of
this generality. The main idea for simplifications is that
obviously inferior methods of analysis for Bob, or infe-
rior cheating methods for Alice need not be considered.
We therefore begin with an explanation of what it means
that one strategy is “obviously inferior”, or weaker than
another (see Sec. III A).
The first application of this idea is the process of pu-
rification, by which a general strategy is turned into an-
other one, which avoids all measurements not demanded
by the communication interface, and turns all decohering
operations into coherent information transfer to ancillas.
Stinespring’s dilation theorem guarantees that this can
always be done. We explain in Sec. III B how the purifi-
cations result in locally coherent strategies, which will be
crucial for Alice’s cheat later on, and have been a part of
all no-go results.
Once a player has chosen a locally coherent strategy,
it is possible to reduce the lab spaces considerably. For
example, if a strategy requires the choice of a mixed
state, this state may have an infinite-dimensional sup-
port Hilbert space. Its purification, however, is a sin-
gle vector, so up to a unitary transformation, which can
be absorbed into subsequent operations, it suffices to
take a one dimensional Hilbert space. We show that
this works for operations as well: for every locally co-
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herent strategy there is a stronger one (in the sense of
Sec. III A), using only finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces,
with a universal dimension bound depending only on the
dimension of quantum messages exchanged so far and
the trusted ressources shared initially. In particular, an
infinite-dimensional lab space will not give more power
to Bob. This will be shown in Sec. III C, and leads to
the consequence that effectively (up to any desired level
of accuracy) we need only consider a finite number of
strategies for Bob.
The next step is in some sense a dual of purification:
purification means that we can avoid measurements dur-
ing a protocol, deferring all such operations to the final
measurement. Similarly, we can move the acts of deci-
sion making during the protocol to the very beginning,
by introducing a strategy register (see Sec. III D), which
is described in the Hilbert space ℓ2(S), for some finite set
S of strategies. The choice of a strategy is then expressed
by preparing some initial state of the strategy register,
and then letting controlled unitaries transcribe this infor-
mation into suitable operations at all later rounds. Let
us denote by bσ Bob’s strategy of installing the strat-
egy register mechanism, and preparing the initial state
σ for that register. The state ρc(a, bσ) at commitment
time then depends linearly on σ, and after specifying the
trusted initial state ρ0 and tracing out Alice’s lab, we
find a channel ΓB(a) depending on Alice’s strategy a,
such that
ΓB(a) :
⊕
x∈Xc
Bx → B(ℓ2(S)) (11)
tr σ ΓB(a)(B) = tr ρBc (a, bσ) B (12)
for all B ∈ ⊕xBx. This channel now summarizes every-
thing that Bob can possibly learn about Alice’s strategy
by choosing his own strategy and making a measurement
in his lab after the commitment. In a simple, purely Ker-
ckhoffian scenario the analogous object is just the state
at commitment time, since one does not allow Bob a
choice of different legitimate strategies. However, in our
more general framework we do need to consider the de-
pendence on σ, and correspondingly cheats which work
uniformly well for all σ.
As an instructive special case, we next suppose that
the protocol is perfectly concealing, which is expressed
by ΓB(a0) = Γ
B(a1). We show in Sec. III E that Alice
then has a perfect cheat. Its existence is guaranteed by
the uniqueness clause in the Stinespring dilation theo-
rem. From this prototype of Alice’s cheat one can see
how an approximate cheat in response to approximate
concealment ΓB(a0) ≈ ΓB(a1) should work.
In the next section we look more carefully into the kind
of approximation ΓB(a0) ≈ ΓB(a1) sufficient to draw the
desired conclusion. It turns out that we need to con-
sider a special attempt of concealment breaking for Bob,
namely keeping an entangled record of the strategy regis-
ter and making a joint measurement on the rest of his sys-
tem and this “backup copy” after commitment. Clearly,
this is a legitimate attempt in our framework, and hence
must already be implicit in the strategies controlled by
the strategy register. However, making this scheme ex-
plicit provides the right kind of norm (cb-norm) on chan-
nels so that a small ||ΓB(a0)− ΓB(a1)||cb guarantees the
existence of an approximately ideal cheat. The techni-
cal result guaranteeing this is a new continuity theorem
[46] for the Stinespring dilation construction, which we
review in Sec. III G.
A. Comparing the Strength of Strategies
Consider two strategies a and a′ of Alice. We will say
that a′ is stronger than a, if whatever Alice can achieve
by strategy a she can also achieve by a′. More explicitly,
we require that there exists a suitable revert operation
Rx : Ax(a)→ Ax(a′) bringing Alice back to strategy a at
whatever node x she so chooses (observe the direction of
arrows due to the Heisenberg picture). That she actually
comes back to a is guaranteed inductively, i.e., we require
that
RxTx(a) = Tx(a
′)
⊕
m∈Mx
(Rxm ⊗ idMxm) (13)
at Alice’s nodes and
Rxm = Rx ⊗ idMxm (14)
at Bob’s nodes.
Tracing this all the way back to the root of the tree we
get, for any of Bob’s protocols b, and for any stage of the
protocol, in particular for the commitment stage Xc,
tr ρc(a, b)
(⊕
x
Fx⊗Gx
)
= tr ρc(a
′, b)
(⊕
x
Rx(Fx)⊗Gx
)
.
(15)
Taking Fx = 1x in Eq. (15) (corresponding to the partial
trace over Alice’s lab space in the Schro¨dinger picture),
we see that Bob’s subsystems are completely unaffected,
i.e., Bob will never be able to tell the difference between a
and a′. The strategic significance of passing to a stronger
strategy is different for Alice and for Bob.
For Bob a stronger b′ is just another strategy to be
considered in the concealing condition and in the condi-
tion for a successful cheat. Since Bob does not loose any
discriminating power in playing coherent, Alice (and we)
might as well assume that he is always using the strongest
strategy available. This simplifies the analysis, as we will
see in more detail below.
For an honest Alice there is no option. Whatever the
honest strategies a0 and a1 specify, she has to follow.
However, since Bob will never know the difference, it
is easy to check from the definitions of concealing and
binding in Sec. II B that whenever (a0, a1) is a bit com-
mitment protocol with security parameters ε and δ, then
so is any pair of stronger strategies (a′0, a
′
1), with the
same parameters. Hence we could assume for the sake of
an impossibility proof that Alice’s honest strategies are
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strengthened in some way. However, there is hardly an
advantage in that assumption, and we will not do so.
For a cheating Alice, using all the power of her in-
finitely well equipped lab, and hence using the strongest
available strategies is clearly the best choice. Indeed,
this will be the only difference between the honest and
the cheating strategies during the commitment phase:
these consists of playing until commitment a particular
strengthening of an honest strategy, namely the local pu-
rification discussed in the next subsection.
B. Local Purification
Intuitively, maintaining coherence during quantum op-
erations is more demanding than allowing thermal noise
and other sources of decoherence to have their way.
Therefore, doing only those measurements needed for sat-
isfying the communication interface rules, but avoiding
all other decoherence should lead to a stronger protocol
in the sense of Sec. III A.
The simplified “locally coherent” strategies are more
easily expressed in terms of operators acting on Hilbert
spaces than by superoperators acting on algebras. There-
fore we need a notation for the message Hilbert spaces as
well, i.e., we setMxm = B(Kxm), where dimKxm = d(x,m)
is the dimension parameter from the description of the
communication tree in Sec. II B 1.
Definition 3 (Locally Coherent Strategy)
We call a strategy a of Alice locally coherent iff for all
communication nodes x we have Ax(a) = B(Hx(a)) and,
at all of Alice’s nodes, the quantum channel Tx(a) :⊕
mAxm(a) ⊗Mxm → Ax(a) from Eq. (2) is given by
operators
Vx,m(a) : Hx(a)→ Hxm(a)⊗Kxm (16)
such that
Tx(a)
(⊕
m
Am ⊗ Ym
)
=
∑
m
Vx,m(a)
∗(Am ⊗ Ym)Vx,m(a)
(17)
for all Am ∈ B(Hxm(a)) and Ym ∈ B(Kxm).
The point here is that each summand in this Tx(a)
is pure, i.e., given by a single Kraus operator Vx,m(a).
This is equivalent to the property that the mth term in
this sum cannot be decomposed into a non-trivial sum
of other completely positive maps, which would in turn
correspond to the extraction of further classical informa-
tion. Using a non-pure map in a strategy would therefore
mean to exercise less than the maximal control allowed
by quantum theory. Note that m is in general a random
outcome, but Alice can make it deterministic by choosing
her strategy a corresponding to Vx,m(a) = δm,m0Vx, with
an isometry Vx.
There is a canonical way to convert any strategy into
a locally coherent one, which is provided by the basic
structure theorem for completely positive maps. We state
it in a form appropriate for the finite-dimensional case
which is needed here. We refer to Paulsen’s text [56] for
further details and the proof.
Proposition 1 (Stinespring Dilation)
Let A be a finite dimensional C*-algebra, H a Hilbert
space, and T : A → B(H) a completely positive map.
Then there is another Hilbert space K, a *-representation
π : A → B(K), and a bounded operator V : H → K such
that, for all A ∈ A,
T (A) = V ∗π(A)V. (18)
If (K0, π0, V0) and (K1, π1, V1) are two such representa-
tions, there is a partial isometry U : K0 → K1 such that
UV0 = V1, (19)
U∗V1 = V0 and (20)
Uπ0(A) = π1(A)U (21)
for all A ∈ A.
We will use this proposition several times, but ignore
the uniqueness statement for the moment. Then we can
iteratively generate a locally coherent protocol aˇ from a,
together with the required revert operations showing that
aˇ is indeed stronger than a. Suppose the space Hx(aˇ)
and the revert channel Rx : Ax(a)→ B(Hx(aˇ)) = Ax(aˇ)
has already been defined along with these objects for all
earlier nodes. We need to extend this definition to all
successor nodes xm. If the node x belongs to Bob, there
is nothing to do since Eq. (14) explicitly defines Rxm. At
Alice’s nodes, we apply the Stinespring Theorem to the
composition
RxTx(a) :
⊕
m∈Mx
Axm(a)⊗Mxm → B(Hx(aˇ)). (22)
The dilation theorem then provides us with a representa-
tion πx of
⊕
m∈Mx Axm(a)⊗Mxm on some Hilbert space
Kx and an isometry Vx:Hx(aˇ) → Kx. Now the projec-
tions Pm in
⊕
m∈Mx Axm(a) ⊗ Mxm which correspond
to the direct sum decomposition over m are mapped
by πx to projections on Kx, so we get a decomposition
into orthogonal subspaces Kx =
⊕
m πx(Pm)Kx. Since
the Pm commute with all other elements of the alge-
bra, the projections πx(Pm) commute with all πx(A),
and A 7→ πx(Pm)πx(A) becomes a representation on
πx(Pm)Kx. This representation can be restricted to the
message algebra Mxm, and since the representation of a
full matrix algebra is unique up to multiplicity (and up
to unitary equivalence indicated by “∼=” in the equations
below), we can split the subspace πx(Pm)Kx into a tensor
product:
πx(Pm)Kx ∼= Hxm(aˇ)⊗Kxm, (23)
πx(1⊗X)πx(Pm) ∼= 1⊗X, (24)
πx(A⊗ 1)πx(Pm) ∼= πxm(A) ⊗ 1. (25)
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At the last line we have used that all πx(A⊗1) commute
with all πx(1 ⊗ X) ∼= (1 ⊗ X), so must be of the form
A′⊗1 for some A′ = πxm(A). We have already indicated
in the notation that the space Hxm(aˇ) arising in this
construction will be chosen as Alice’s lab Hilbert space for
the coherent strategy aˇ. The revert operation will simply
be Rxm = πxm : Axm(a) → B(Hxm(aˇ)) and, finally, the
isometries of the pure strategy will be
Vx,m(aˇ) ∼= πx(Pm)Vx(a): Hx(aˇ) → πx(Pm)Kx (26)
∼= Hxm(aˇ)⊗Kxm.
Then Eq. (13) holds by virtue of the Stinespring repre-
sentation, and we have shown that aˇ is indeed stronger
than a.
To summarize: for every strategy a there is a stronger
locally coherent strategy aˇ. Moreover, the corresponding
revert operation can be chosen to be a representation for
all x. Of course, the same construction holds for Bob’s
nodes.
In the sequel we will assume from now on that Bob
uses coherent strategies, since this does not constrain
his power to resolve Alice’s actions at any stage. As
we will show in the proof of Th. 4, Alice’s cheat consists
in playing suitable purified strategies, too. By means of
Eq. (15), purification on Alice’s side will give Bob no clue
whatsoever about her cheating attempt.
C. Bounding Local Hilbert Space Dimensions
It is a crucial point in the definition of concealment
that no limitations are imposed on Bob’s capabilities. In
particular, he could choose to use arbitrarily large local
lab Hilbert spaces. In principle, this makes scanning all
of Bob’s strategies for checking ε-concealment an infinite
task. However, the purification construction takes care
of this aspect as well, and we will show that without loss
of discrimination power Bob can fix the dimension of his
lab spaces uniformly over all his strategies.
The Stinespring construction respects finite dimension-
ality. Usually one takes a “minimal” dilation, which
means that the vectors π(A)V φ with A ∈ A and φ ∈ H
are dense in K. Hence dimK ≤ dimA · dimH. How-
ever, since this bound still contains the algebra A, which
is part of the strategy whose purification generates the
locally coherent protocol, and which is not a priori
bounded, this argument does not suffice to derive a uni-
form dimension bound on local lab spaces.
The desired bound can be constructed by looking di-
rectly at the definition of locally coherent strategies. Here
the growth of Bob’s lab space is given by the two opera-
tions
Vx,m(b) : Hx(b)→ Kxm ⊗Hxm(b) (27)
at Bob’s nodes and
Hxm(b) = Kxm ⊗Hx(b) (28)
at Alice’s nodes.
Given the dimensions of Hx(b) and Kxm, the first line per
se does not imply a bound on the dimension of Hxm(b).
However, the range of Vx,m has known finite dimension,
so most of these dimensions will never be used. More
precisely, we can find a subspace H′xm(b) ⊂ Hxm(b) such
that
Vx,m(b)
(
Hx(b)
)
⊂ Kxm ⊗H′xm(b). (29)
Indeed, we can takeH′xm(b) as the span of all vectors φα,j
appearing in the expansion Vx,m(b)φα =
∑
j ψj ⊗ φα,j ,
where {ψj} ⊂ Kxm and {φα} ⊂ Hx(b) are orthonormal
bases. Hence
dimH′xm(b) ≤ dimHx(b) dimKxm. (30)
We can now apply this idea inductively, i.e., with a
previously constructed H′x(b) ⊂ Hx(b) on the left hand
side of Eq. (29). Note that at Alice’s nodes there is noth-
ing to choose, and the dimension bound Eq. (30) holds
with equality anyhow. At the root we have dimH0(b) =
dimH′0(b) =: dB0 ∈ N for all strategies, the dimension of
Bob’s initial state space.
Hence we have a new strategy, using the same isome-
tries Vx,m(b) as b, but with domains and ranges restricted
to a subspace Hx(b′) ≡ H′x(b) ⊂ Hx(b) for all b. We
show now that b′ is stronger than b. The required re-
vert operation is implemented by the subspace embed-
ding jx:Hx(b′)→ Hx(b), as Rx(B) = j∗xBjx and, due to
Eq. (29), the operators Vx,m for the new strategies are
connected by
Vxm(b) jx = (1⊗ jxm)Vxm(b′):Hx(b′)→ Kxm ⊗Hxm(b),
(31)
where jxm is the embedding of H′xm(b) into Hxm(b).
Eq. (13) then follows by combining this with Eq. (17) in
a version adapted to Bob’s pure strategies. An intuitive
description of this revert operation in the Schro¨dinger
picture is to ask Bob to consider his density operator on
Hx(b′) as a density operator on the larger space Hx(b),
by setting it equal to zero on the orthogonal complement.
It is perhaps paradoxical that in this case the strategy
using less resources is stronger. But in fact, they are
just equally strong. The revert operation in the opposite
direction is Sx : B(Hx(b′))→ B(Hx(b)), with
Sx(B) = jxBj
∗
x + ρx(B)(1− jxj∗x), (32)
where ρx is an arbitrary state on B(Hx(b′)). The sec-
ond term is added to satisfy the channel normalization
Sx(1) = 1. Since j
∗
xjx = 1, we have RxSx = id . The
revert operation in this case is thus the projection on the
subspace Hx(b′) ⊂ Hx(b).
Taking together the reduction operation, and, possibly
an expansion as described (adding some extra dimensions
on which all states vanish), we can convert any strategy b
to another one, for which the dimension bound Eq. (30)
holds with equality, at both Bob’s and Alice’s nodes. But
then we can identify all the spaces Hx(b′) with a fixed
space of appropriate dimension, say HBx .
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Applying the same construction to Alice’s operations,
we find a strategy-independent Hilbert spaceHAx . In par-
ticular, we will henceforth assume Hx(aˇ0) = Hx(aˇ1) =
HAx at all nodes x for Alice’s locally coherent strategies
aˇi. This will simplify the discussion of Alice’s cheating
strategy in Secs. III E and IIIG below.
We summarize this section in the following Proposi-
tion, which we formulate for Bob’s strategies. It holds
equally for Alice’s strategies, too.
Proposition 2 (Dimension Bound)
Let HBx denote a family of Hilbert spaces with dimensions
satisfying
dimHBxm = dimHBx dimKxm (33)
and dimHB0 = dB0 ∈ N (34)
for all nodes x. Then for every locally coherent strategy b
of Bob there is an equally strong locally coherent strategy
b′ with Hx(b′) = HBx for all x.
The entire strategy dependence is now contained in the
choice of the operators Vx,m(b
′).
Corollary 3 In the definitions of ε-concealing and δ-
cheating strategy, we may restrict the quantifier over all
of Bob’s strategies to locally coherent strategies with a
strategy-independent lab Hilbert space HBx .
For every ξ > 0 there is a finite set S of such strategies
approximating all of Bob’s discriminating procedures to
within ξ. That is, for any strategy b of Bob we can find
b′ ∈ S such that for all of Alice’s strategies a:
‖ρc(a, b)− ρc(a, b′)‖1 ≤ ξ. (35)
The proof of Corollary 3 is obvious from the dimension
bound, and the observation that the set of bounded op-
erators between Hilbert spaces of fixed finite dimension
is compact in the norm topology.
D. Bob’s Strategy Register
The next simplification we would like to introduce will
significantly reduce the complexity of the many-round
scenario. The basic idea is to replace all of Bob’s choices
by a single choice he makes at the beginning by prepar-
ing a suitable initial state. His later choices will then be
taken over by a sequence of “quantum controlled opera-
tions”. This reorganization of Bob’s choices requires the
expansion of the lab space by an additional register, to
hold the control information. It is perhaps worthwhile to
emphasize that this strategy register serves merely as a
technical tool in the no-go proof.
We will choose a finite approximation S to Bob’s strat-
egy space in the sense of Corollary 3, with a very small
value of ξ, which will be taken to zero at the end. The
strategy register will be described by the Hilbert space
ℓ2(S), the complex valued functions on S, with the usual
scalar product. In other words, we have one basis vector
|b〉 for each strategy b ∈ S. Then we set
H˜Bx = HBx ⊗ ℓ2(S) (36)
V˜x,m : H˜Bx → H˜Bxm ⊗Kxm (37)
V˜x,m =
∑
b∈S
Vx,m(b)⊗ |b〉〈b| (38)
Observe that V˜x,m is now independent of Bob’s strat-
egy (it depends on S). However, Bob still has a choice
to make, namely the choice of the initial state for the
strategy register. If he wants to play strategy b, he will
set it to |b〉〈b| and then let the pre-programmed controls
take over.
The construction also opens up the rather interesting
possibility for Bob to play strategies in superposition,
simply by initially preparing a superposition of the basis
states |b〉. For this case it is helpful to bear in mind that
the “control” by “controlled unitary operations” is not a
one way affair. As soon as Bob prepares superpositions,
the strategy register is in general affected by the interac-
tion, so by “measuring the strategy” after a while, Bob
could pick up some clues about Alice’s actions. This is
required by basic laws of quantum mechanics, because
the controlled-unitary operation creates entanglement.
Let us consider the overall effect of the protocol up
to commitment, with the trusted shared initial state ρ0
considered fixed, Bob choosing an arbitrary initial state
σ ∈ B∗(ℓ2(S)) (possibly mixed) for the strategy regis-
ter, and Alice playing strategy a. At commitment, the
observable algebra is now
⊕
x∈Xc Ax(a) ⊗ B(H˜Bx ). The
state obtained on this algebra depends linearly on the
initial state σ, and being implemented by a series of com-
pletely positive transformations, this dependence is given
by a quantum channel Γ(a). In the Heisenberg picture
we thus have
Γ(a) :
⊕
x∈Xc
Ax(a)⊗ B(H˜Bx )→ B(ℓ2(S)). (39)
The restriction of the final state to Bob’s side is what de-
cides his chances of distinguishing different strategies of
Alice. These restrictions are given by the reduced chan-
nel ΓB(a) :
⊕
x∈Xc B(H˜Bx )→ B(ℓ2(S)), given by
ΓB(a)
(⊕
x∈Xc
Bx
)
= Γ(a)
(⊕
x∈Xc
1Ax(a) ⊗Bx
)
. (40)
The concealment condition requires that ΓB(a0) ≈
ΓB(a1). The aim of the impossibility proof is to conclude
from this the existence of a good cheating strategy for
Alice. For this conclusion it turns out to be crucial how
the approximate equality of these channels is expressed
quantitatively. We defer this discussion to Sec. III F, and
treat first the case ΓB(a0) = Γ
B(a1), which requires only
the Stinespring dilation theorem, and shows more clearly
what properties we need to establish in the approximate
case.
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E. The Case of Perfect Concealment
In the sequel Bob is always understood to take advan-
tage of his strategy register and pre-programmed con-
trols, as described in Sec. III D. So we will henceforth
drop the tilde on Bob’s Hilbert spaces H˜Bx to streamline
the presentation.
For the case of perfect concealment, suppose that
ΓB(a0) = Γ
B(a1), and that Alice is preparing to cheat.
She will then play the local purification aˇi (i = 0, 1)
of one of the honest strategies until commitment time.
Note that both Alice’s and Bob’s strategies are assumed
to be locally coherent in the sense of Sec. III B, with
Hilbert space dimensions independent of their respec-
tive strategies as explained in Sec. III C. The concate-
nated channel Γ(aˇi):⊕xB(HAx ) ⊗ B(HBx ) → B(ℓ2(S))
is then likewise pure, and is hence given by operators
Vi,x : ℓ
2(S)→ HAx ⊗HBx as
Γ(aˇi)
(⊕
x∈Xc
(Ax ⊗Bx)
)
=
∑
x∈Xc
V ∗i,x(Ax ⊗Bx)Vi,x
= V ∗i
( ⊕
x∈Xc
(Ax ⊗Bx)
)
Vi.
(41)
For the last step we have combined all the Vi,x into a
single operator Vi : ℓ
2(S) → K := ⊕xHAx ⊗ HBx , and
the direct sum refers to the direct sum decomposition of
the underlying Hilbert space K. Note that this Hilbert
space carries a representation π of Bob’s observable al-
gebra
⊕
x B(HBx ) at commitment time, simply by setting
π(
⊕
xBx) =
⊕
x 1
A
x ⊗ Bx. Hence (K, π, Vi) is a dilation
of the channel ΓB(aˇi) in the sense of Prop. 1.
But now, by assumption ΓB(aˇ0) = Γ
B(a0) = Γ
B(a1) =
ΓB(aˇ1). Hence we get two dilations of the same channel,
which must be connected by a unitary operator U ∈ B(K)
as in Prop. 1. Essentially, this U will be Alice’s cheat
operation. What we have to show is that she can execute
this operation on the system under her control, given the
classical information x.
The condition Uπ(Y ) = π(Y )U , applied to a projec-
tion Y = Px of one of the summands implies that U can
be broken into blocks, Uπ(Px) = π(Px)U ∈ B(HAx ⊗HBx ).
The intertwining relation for π(Bx) allows us to conclude
that this operator is of the form Ux⊗1Bx , with a unitary
operator Ux ∈ B(HAx ). Clearly, Ux is an operator between
possible lab spaces of Alice, depending only on publicly
available information x ∈ Xc. This will be Alice’s cheat
channel. Setting
Cx:B(Hx(aˇ1))→ B(Hx(aˇ0)) Cx(A) = U∗xAUx, (42)
we immediately conclude from UV0 = V1 that
Γ(aˇ0)(
⊕
x
Cx ⊗ idBx ) = Γ(aˇ1). (43)
Let us summarize Alice’s perfect cheat. She will play
the purification aˇ0 of the honest strategy a0 until com-
mitment time. If at that time she decides to go for the
bit value 0, she will just apply the revert operation from
the purification construction. After that nobody can tell
the difference between her actions and the honest a0, not
even with full access to both labs. On the other hand,
if she wants to choose bit value 1, she will apply the
cheat channel Cx. We see from Eq. (43) that afterwards
nobody will be able to tell the difference between her ac-
tions and aˇ1. Finally, she will apply the revert operation
from aˇ1 to a1, hiding all her tracks. Note that the re-
vert operation by construction works at any step: indeed
Alice can cheat at any time, since the protocol must be
concealing for all steps in order to be concealing at the
commitment stage.
F. Bob’s Entangled Strategy Record
In the previous section we have seen how Stinespring’s
theorem allows Alice to find a perfect cheat in a per-
fectly concealing bit commitment protocol. The conti-
nuity theorem presented in Section IIIG below shows
that the same cheating strategy still works for Alice
with high probability under more realistic conditions
— when only approximate concealment is guaranteed,
ΓB(a0) ≈ ΓB(a1). The result crucially depends on the
way in which the distance between these two channels is
evaluated: Bob can test the condition ΓB(a0) ≈ ΓB(a1)
by preparing a state σ for the strategy register ℓ2(S),
and making a measurement on the system HBx he re-
ceives back from Alice. This includes both the possibility
to superpose his original strategies |b〉, and the possibil-
ity to mix such strategies in the sense of game theory.
However, this still does not exhaust his options: he can
keep an entangled record of his strategy. This would be
pointless for just classical mixtures of his basic strategies
|b〉. In that case all his density operators would commute
with the “strategy observable”, and he could extract the
initial strategy by a von Neumann measurement from
the state at any later step. However, if he also uses su-
perpositions of strategies, the controlled unitaries may
properly “change” the strategy. It therefore makes sense
to keep a record, i.e., to not only use a mixed initial state,
which would correspond to a mixed strategy in the sense
of von Neumann’s game theory, but to use an entangled
pure state on ℓ2(S)⊗ ℓ2(S′), with some reference system
S′. It turns out that one can always choose S′ ∼= S (cf.
Prop. 8.11 in Paulsen’s text [56]). While the first copy in
this tensor product is used as before to drive the condi-
tional strategy operators Vx, the second is the record and
is completely left out of the dynamics. In other words,
Bob not only uses a von Neumann mixed strategy, but
the purification of this mixture. Concealment will then
have to be guaranteed against his joint measurements on
HxB ⊗ ℓ2(S′).
We will see in Sec. VB that this procedure in gen-
eral does increase Bob’s resolution for the difference of
channels. Of course, if the initial selection of strate-
gies S
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tum randomized strategy will already be contained in
S, and the gain may be negligible. Mathematically,
the introduction of randomized strategies corresponds
to using a different norm: to guarantee concealment
in the sense of Def. 1, Alice will have to make sure
that
∥∥(ΓB(a0)− ΓB(a1))⊗ id ν∥∥ ≤ ε if ν-dimensional
bystander systems are taken into account, for all ν ∈ N.
As explained in the Appendix, this just means that these
two channels need to be indistinguishable in cb-norm,∥∥ΓB(a0)− ΓB(a1)∥∥cb ≤ ε for some small ε > 0.
G. The Full Impossibility Proof
The full impossibility proof goes beyond the case of
perfect concealment discussed in Sec. III E. It shows
that Alice can still cheat if the bit commitment protocol
is only approximately concealing, and provides explicit
dimension-independent bounds on Alice’s probability to
pass Bob’s tests undetected:
Theorem 4 (No-Go Theorem)
Any ε-concealing bit commitment protocol in the sense of
Sec. II B allows Alice to find a 2
√
ε-cheating strategy.
These bounds coincide with those obtained by Spekkens
and Rudolph [23] in the Kerckoffian framework. Our
proof shows that they still hold if Bob no longer sticks to
a publicly known strategy. This is a significant improve-
ment over Cheung’s dimension-dependent estimates [50],
which do not suffice to rule out bit commitment protocols
with large systems.
The full no-go proof is based on a continuity result for
Stinespring’s dilation theorem, which we cite here from
[46]. It states that two quantum channels ΓB0 , Γ
B
1 are
close in cb-norm iff there exist corresponding Stinespring
isometries V0, V1 which are close in operator norm. This
generalizes the uniqueness clause in Stinespring’s theo-
rem to cases in which two quantum channels differ by a
finite amount, and hence is precisely the type of result
we need to rule out approximately concealing bit com-
mitment protocols.
Proposition 5 (Continuity Theorem)
Let H and HB be finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, and
suppose that
ΓB0 ,Γ
B
1 : B(HB)→ B(H) (44)
are quantum channels with Stinespring isometries
V0, V1:H → HA ⊗HB and a common dilation space HA
such that dimHA ≥ 2 dimH dimHB. We then have:
inf
U
‖(U ⊗ 1B)V0 − V1‖2 ≤
∥∥ΓB0 − ΓB1 ∥∥cb
≤ 2 inf
U
‖(U ⊗ 1B)V0 − V1‖ ,
(45)
where the minimization is over all unitary U ∈ B(HA).
We refer to [46] for a proof of Prop. 5 and further ap-
plications of the continuity theorem. In this form the
result applies to quantum channels whose common do-
main is a full matrix algebra, while in our case the do-
main algebra of the commitment channels ΓBi ≡ ΓB(aˇi)
is the direct sum ⊕xB(HBx ). Again we have dropped
the tilde from Bob’s Hilbert spaces in an attempt to
streamline the presentation. In order to apply the con-
tinuity theorem to our setting, we extend the chan-
nels Γi ≡ Γ(aˇi):⊕xB(HAx ) ⊗ B(HBx ) → B(H) to chan-
nels Γˆ0, Γˆ1:B(HA ⊗ HB) → B(K), where we have in-
troduced the shortcuts H := ℓ2(S), HA := ⊕xHAx and
HB := ⊕xHBx . Note that the tensor product HA ⊗ HB
has the direct sum decomposition ⊕xyHAx ⊗HBy , and that
⊕xB(HAx ⊗HBx ) is the subalgebra in B(HA⊗HB) which
consists of those operators that are supported on the di-
agonal subspace ⊕xHAx ⊗ HBx . For direct sum channels
Γi(⊕xAx ⊗ Bx) =
∑
x V
∗
i,x(Ax ⊗ Bx)Vi,x as in Eq. (41),
the extensions Γˆi = Vˆ
∗
i (·)Vˆi have Stinespring isometries
Vˆ0, Vˆ1:H → HA ⊗HB = ⊕xyHAx ⊗HBy given by
Vˆiψ :=
⊕
xy
δxyVi,xψ . (46)
In the sequel we assume that the dilation spaces are cho-
sen sufficiently large such that the dimension bound in
Prop. 5 is met. The restrictions of Γˆi to Bob’s out-
put system HB will be denoted by ΓˆBi . We then have
ΓˆBi = Γ
B
i ◦ P , where the cp-map
P :B(HB)→ ⊕x B(HBx ) P (B) = ⊕x PxBPx (47)
is composed of the projections Px in HB onto HBx . Since∥∥∥ΓˆB0 − ΓˆB1 ∥∥∥
cb
=
∥∥(ΓB0 − ΓB1 ) ◦ P∥∥cb ≤ ∥∥ΓB0 − ΓB1 ∥∥cb ,
(48)
we may now apply the left half of the continuity esti-
mate Eq. (45) to the extended quantum channels ΓˆBi to
conclude that
inf
U
∥∥∥(U ⊗ 1B)Vˆ0 − Vˆ1∥∥∥2 ≤ ∥∥∥ΓˆB0 − ΓˆB1 ∥∥∥
cb
≤
∥∥∥Γˆ0 − Γˆ1∥∥∥
cb
.
(49)
The minimization at this point is with respect to all uni-
tary U ∈ B(HA), which can be given the block decom-
position
Uψ =
⊕
x
∑
y
Uxyψy (50)
with operators Uxy : HAy → HAx . It turns out that the
minimization in Eq. (49) can always be restricted to uni-
tary operators whose off-diagonal blocks vanish. To see
this, note that the left hand side of Eq. (49) can be rewrit-
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ten as
inf
U
∥∥∥(U ⊗ 1B)Vˆ0 − Vˆ1∥∥∥2
= inf
U
sup
̺
tr ̺
(
Vˆ ∗0 (U
∗ ⊗ 1B)− Vˆ ∗1
) (
(U ⊗ 1B)Vˆ0 − Vˆ1
)
= inf
U
sup
̺
(
2− 2Re tr ̺ Vˆ ∗1 (U ⊗ 1B)Vˆ0
)
(51)
where the supremum is taken over all states ̺ ∈ B∗(H).
From the definition of the isometries Vˆi in Eq. (46) above
it is straightforward to verify that
Vˆ ∗1 (U ⊗ 1B)Vˆ0 =
∑
x
V ∗1,x(Uxx ⊗ 1x)V0,x (52)
in Eq. (51). Therefore, the minimization procedure on
the left hand side of Eq. (49) is not affected by the off-
diagonal blocks {Uxy, x 6= y}, which implies that the in-
fimum is attained at a unitary operator that is a direct
sum of unitaries, U = ⊕xUx ∈ ⊕xB(HAx ). On the other
hand, the cb-norm difference
∥∥ΓB0 − ΓB1 ∥∥cb is easily seen
to be upper bounded by 2 ‖(U ⊗ 1B)V0 − V1‖ for any
unitary operator U = ⊕xUx.
In summary, we have shown that the continuity the-
orem extends to direct sum channels with a unitary U
that respects the direct-sum decomposition:
Proposition 6 (Continuity Theorem for Direct
Sum Channels)
Let H be a finite-dimensional Hilbert space, and
let {HBx }x∈X and {HAx }x∈X be collections of finite-
dimensional Hilbert spaces. Suppose that V0, V1:H →
⊕xHAx ⊗HBx are Stinespring isometries for the quantum
channels Γ1,Γ2:⊕xB(HAx ⊗HBx )→ B(H) such that
Γi
(⊕
x
(Ax ⊗Bx)
)
=
∑
x
V ∗i,x(Ax ⊗Bx)Vi,x
= V ∗i
(⊕
x
(Ax ⊗Bx)
)
Vi
(53)
and dimHAx ≥ 2 dimHBx dimH for all x ∈ X. Let
ΓBi :⊕xB(HBx ) → B(H) be the local restrictions given by
ΓBi (⊕xBx) := V ∗i (⊕x1Ax ⊗Bx)Vi. We then have:
inf
U
‖(U ⊗ 1B)V0 − V1‖2 ≤
∥∥ΓB0 − ΓB1 ∥∥cb
≤ 2 inf
U
‖(U ⊗ 1B)V0 − V1‖ ,
(54)
where the minimization is over all unitary operators U =
⊕xUx ∈ ⊕x B(HAx ).
The proof of the no-go theorem now immediately follows
from Prop. 6.
Proof of Th. 4: Alice will play the purification
aˇ0 of the honest strategy a0 until commitment time.
If at that time she decides to go for the bit value 0,
she will just apply the revert operation R from the
purification construction, as described in Sec III B. It
is then no longer possible to tell the difference between
her actions and the honest a0, not even with full access
to both labs. On the other hand, if she wants to
choose bit value 1, she will apply the cheat channel
Cx:B(Hx(aˇ1))→ B(Hx(aˇ0)) given by Cx(A) := U∗xAUx,
where U := ⊕xUx ∈ ⊕x B(HAx ) is the unitary operator
that attains the infimum in Eq. (54) above. In the
purification construction detailed in Sec. III B we have
for simplicity assumed minimal dilation spaces. Yet
in order to apply the sneak flip operation, Alice may
possibly need to double her local lab space ⊕x B(HAx ) to
satisfy the dimension bound in Prop. 6. However, this
can always be postponed right until before the cheat,
only requires an additional (sufficiently large) ancilla
system, and hence does not constrain Alice’s options.
Given an ε-concealing bit commitment protocol
with local channels ΓB(ai) in the sense of Def. 1,
we conclude from our discussion in Sec. III F that∥∥ΓB(a0)− ΓB(a1)∥∥cb ≤ ε. Hence, the continuity esti-
mate implies that∥∥∥∥∥Γ(aˇ0)(⊕
x
Cx ⊗ idBx
)− Γ(aˇ1)
∥∥∥∥∥
cb
≤ 2
∥∥(U ⊗ 1B)V (aˇ0)− V (aˇ1)∥∥
≤ 2
√
‖ΓB(a0)− ΓB(a1)‖cb ≤ 2
√
ε ,
(55)
where V (aˇ0), V (aˇ1) are Stinespring isometries for Γ(aˇ0)
and Γ(aˇ1), respectively. Since the cb-norm difference
cannot increase under quantum channels, the same
bound holds after Alice’s revert operation R,∥∥∥∥∥Γ(aˇ0)(⊕
x
Cx ⊗ idBx
)
R− Γ(a1)
∥∥∥∥∥
cb
≤ 2√ε. (56)
Alice can then confidently announce the bit value 1 in
the opening. The probability of her cheat being detected
is upper bounded by 2
√
ε. This concludes the proof of
the strengthened no-go theorem. 
IV. QBC IN INFINITE DIMENSIONS
In this Section we will relax the general finiteness con-
dition imposed in Secs. II and III and show how to extend
the no-go proof to quantum bit commitment protocols
in which the dimension of the underlying Hilbert spaces
(Sec. IVA), the number of rounds (Sec. IVB), or the set
of classical signals (Sec. IVC) are infinite.
A. Continuous Variable Systems
We have so far restricted the discussion of the no-
go theorem to systems that can be described in finite-
dimensional (albeit arbitrarily large) Hilbert spaces. In
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this section we show that the results can be easily ex-
tended to continuous variable systems — as long as the
systems obey a global energy constraint of a reasonably
generic form. The total available energy for the protocol
needs to be finite but can otherwise be as high as de-
sired, and yet secure quantum bit commitment remains
impossible. Purists might dismiss this additional energy
constraint on the basis that it restricts the domain for the
impossibility proof. Yet most physicists know that infi-
nite energy is seldom available. In fact, the continuity
theorem for Stinespring’s dilation may be generalized to
completely positive maps between arbitrary C∗-algebras
[52], and hence the no-go theorem applies to continuous
variable systems with unbounded energy, too. But these
results are somewhat beyond the scope of the present pa-
per, so we assume a uniform energy constraint to simplify
the presentation.
To set the stage, assume that H is a separable (but no
longer necessarily finite-dimensional) Hilbert space. As
before, let B∗(H) denote the Banach space of trace-class
operators on H, and S(H) ⊂ B∗(H) the closed convex set
of states. We further assume that H :D → H is an un-
bounded self-adjoint (energy) operator defined on a dense
set D ⊂ H. (From the Hellinger-Toeplitz theorem (cf.
Sec. III.4 in [53]) we know that a symmetric unbounded
operator cannot be defined on all of H, so we always as-
sume a dense subset D.) For the proof we assume that
H has discrete spectrum, that all of its eigenvalues hn
have finite multiplicity, and that limn→∞ hn = ∞. Un-
der these conditions, the set of states
SE(H) :=
{
̺ ∈ S(H) | tr ̺H ≤ E} (57)
can be shown to be compact for every E ≥ 0 [54]. As
we assume this energy constraint to be global, we impose
that it is respected by the quantum operation T∗ that de-
scribes the full bit commitment protocol: T∗(̺) ∈ SE(H)
for all ̺ ∈ SE(H).
Since the continuity theorem applies in this setting
[46], the proof presented in Sec. III goes trough un-
changed. There is also a simpler proof, which avoids
the compactness arguments and is based on a useful ap-
proximation result: any infinite-dimensional system with
energy constraints as in Eq. (57) can be approximated to
arbitrary degree of accuracy by a sufficiently large finite-
dimensional system. This allows to reduce any bit com-
mitment protocol to its finite-dimensional counterpart:
Proposition 7 Given an ε-concealing and δ-binding
quantum bit commitment protocol with a global energy
constraint as in Eq. (57). Then for any γ > 0 there
is a corresponding protocol on finite-dimensional Hilbert
spaces with dimension d = d(γ) which is (ε + γ)-
concealing and (δ + γ)-binding.
Since the latter protocol is unfeasible for sufficiently small
parameters ε, δ and γ, so is the former.
The finite-dimensional approximation needed for the
proof of Prop. 7 relies on the following two lemmas:
Lemma 8 Let γ > 0 and SE(H) as in Eq. (57). Then
there exists a finite-dimensional projector Pγ such that
tr ̺Pγ ≥ 1− γ ∀ ̺ ∈ SE(H). (58)
As a consequence, every system with energy constraints
is essentially supported on a finite-dimensional Hilbert
space.
Lemma 9 Let γ > 0 and Pγ as in Lemma 8. Then
for every quantum channel T∗:B∗(H) → B∗(H) which
respects the energy constraint Eq. (57) we have:
‖T∗(̺)− 1
trPγT∗(Pγ̺Pγ)
Pγ T∗(Pγ̺Pγ)Pγ‖1
≤ 4√γ + 2γ
1− γ
(59)
for all ̺ ∈ SE(H).
The proof of Prop. 7 is then straightforward: Given the
continuous-variable bit commitment protocol with en-
ergy bound E and security parameters ε and δ, we con-
struct its finite-dimensional companion by projecting on
the subspace PγH, with the finite-dimensional projector
Pγ chosen as in Lemma 8. We know from the discus-
sion in Sec. III that both the concealment and the bind-
ingness condition can be expressed in terms of appropri-
ately chosen quantum channels T∗. By assumption, these
will respect the energy constraint. The approximation in
Lemma 9 then guarantees that for sufficiently small γ the
companion protocol has nearly identical security param-
eters. Substituting 4
√
γ + 2γ1−γ 7→ γ, this concludes the
proof.
It remains to prove the approximation lemmas. The
proof of Lemma 8 appears in [54]. We include it here for
completeness:
Proof of Lemma 8: Let the eigenvalues of H be
arranged in increasing order: h1 ≤ h2 ≤ h3 ≤ . . ., with
eigenprojector Pn corresponding to the eigenvalue hn.
For N ∈ N, we set PˆN :=
∑N
n=1 Pn. We then have for
all ψ ∈ H:
〈ψ|hN+1
(
1− PˆN
)|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|hN+1 ∞∑
n=N+1
Pn|ψ〉
≤ 〈ψ|
∞∑
n=N+1
hnPn|ψ〉
≤ 〈ψ|H |ψ〉, (60)
implying that hN+1(1 − PˆN ) ≤ H for all N ∈ N. We
may then conclude that
tr ̺
(
1− PˆN
) ≤ 1
hN+1
tr ̺H ≤ E
hN+1
(61)
for all ̺ ∈ SE(H). Since the sequence {hN}N diverges,
the result follows by choosing Pγ := PˆN0 for some
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sufficiently large N0. 
Proof of Lemma 9: An application of the trian-
gle inequality shows that
‖̺− Pγ̺Pγ‖1 ≤ ‖̺− Pγ̺‖1 + ‖Pγ̺− Pγ̺Pγ‖1
≤ ‖(1− Pγ)̺‖1 + ‖̺(1− Pγ)‖1. (62)
For ̺ ∈ SE(H) we know from Lemma 8 that tr (1 −
Pγ)̺ ≤ γ, and thus the two terms on the right of Eq. (62)
may be bounded as follows:
‖(1− Pγ)̺‖1 = trU(1− Pγ)̺
≤ tr 12√̺UU∗√̺ tr 12√̺(1− Pγ)√̺
≤ √γ, (63)
where we have used the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality for
the Hilbert-Schmidt inner product, and U denotes the
polar isometry of (1−Pγ)̺. Analogously, we have ‖̺(1−
Pγ)‖1 ≤ √γ, which together with Eqs. (62) and (63)
implies that
‖̺− Pγ̺Pγ‖1 ≤ 2√γ. (64)
For all ̺ ∈ SE(H), the renormalized state 1trPγ̺Pγ̺Pγ
satisfies the estimate
1
trPγ̺
Pγ̺Pγ − Pγ̺Pγ ≤ γ
1− γPγ̺Pγ , (65)
which in combination with Eq. (64) implies that
‖̺− 1
trPγ̺
Pγ̺Pγ‖1 ≤ 2√γ + γ
1− γ . (66)
Since the trace norm cannot increase under quantum op-
erations [21], the upper bound also holds for the norm
difference ‖T∗(̺) − 1trPγ̺T∗(Pγ̺Pγ)‖1. As the quantum
channel T∗ is supposed to respect the energy constraint
Eq. (57), an analogous chain of estimates for the output
states of the channel and yet another application of the
triangle inequality then yield the desired result. 
B. An Infinite Number of Rounds
In this Section we will show how the no-go proof can
be extended to cover quantum bit commitment protocols
with a possibly infinite number of rounds — as long as
the expected number of total rounds remains finite. Just
as with the energy constraints discussed in Sec. IVA, for
any practical purpose this additional assumption does
not restrict the domain of the impossibility proof.
We begin by explaining how the framework introduced
in Sec. II can be modified to easily accommodate bit com-
mitment protocols with an infinite number of rounds in
each the commitment, holding, and opening phase. As
in the previous Section, the impossibility proof will then
follow from an approximation argument.
As described in detail in Sec. II B, each layer Xt of
the communication tree consists of a finite number of
nodes. Each node x ∈ Xt is connected with nodes
xm ∈ Xt+1 of the following layer, corresponding to the
classical message m ∈ Mx. However, there is no longer
a definite layer for which a commitment or opening has
been reached. Instead, there are now infinitely many lay-
ers Xt, t ∈ N. If Alice and Bob choose a definite pair of
strategies, they check by means of suitable measurements
how many rounds t have been performed, and whether
they are willing to continue. The number of rounds then
naturally plays the role of a classical random variable.
Introducing the bundle of algebras
F : t 7→ F t :=
⊕
x∈Xt
Ax ⊗ Bx , (67)
the total system is now described by the algebra C(F) of
all bounded sections
F : t 7→ F (t) ∈ F t , (68)
where the norm in C(F) is the standard supremum norm
given by ‖F‖ = supt∈N ‖F (t)‖.
Alice’s observable algebra, which we denote by C(A),
is the subalgebra in C(F) which consists of all bounded
sections A that assign to every number of rounds t an
operator A(t) belonging to Alice’s subsystem:
A : t 7→ A(t) ∈ At :=
⊕
x∈Xt
Ax ⊗ 1B,x . (69)
The observable algebra C(B) of Bob’s system is defined
completely analogously. In our setup for protocols, each
strategy a that Alice chooses is related to a channel
Γ(a) : C(F)→ B(ℓ2(S)) , (70)
containing all her possible responses to strategies that
Bob can play by a suitable preparation of his strategy
register ℓ2(S).
The channels Γ(a) include naturally the necessary tests
to decide for each round whether to remain in the com-
mitment phase or to proceed with the holding or opening
phase. The measurement of the number of rounds cor-
responds to the embedding of the abelian C∗-algebra of
bounded functions on N – denoted by C(N) –, which is
obviously a subalgebra of C(F). Let δt be the function
in C(N) which takes the value δt(t) = 1 and δt(s) = 0 if
s 6= t, and let σ be some state on B(ℓ2(S)) determining
Bob’s strategy. Then, by definition, the quantity
P (a, σ|t) := tr(σ Γ(a)(δt)) (71)
is the probability that the commitment phase has been
reached at round t, provided Alice plays a and Bob plays
σ.
As advertised above, we now impose the reasonable
assumption that whenever Alice plays honestly the ex-
pected number of rounds until commitment is uniformly
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bounded in the choice of Bob’s initial state σ: denoting
by a0 and a1 Alice’s honest strategies to commit either
0 or 1, respectively, there is a finite constant T ∈ R such
that
sup
σ
∑
t∈N
P (ai, σ|t) t ≤ T (72)
holds for i = 0, 1. The basic idea for the proof of the no-
go result is now to relate this bound to the energy bound
of the previous subsection, and hence approximate a pro-
tocol with possibly infinitely many rounds by a protocol
with “a priori” finitely many moves. As “Hamiltonian”,
the number-of-rounds-operator
H =
∑
t∈N
δt (73)
is perfectly suited. In line with Eq. (57), it is then enough
to ensure that the states Γ(ai)∗(σ) lie inside SE(L2(H))
for an appropriately chosen constant E, where L2(H) is
the Hilbert space of square integrable sections
ψ : t 7→ ψ(t) ∈ Ht :=
⊕
x∈Xt
HAx ⊗HBx . (74)
Indeed, we conclude from Eq. (72) that for each initial
state σ the inequality
tr(Γ(ai)∗(σ)H) =
∑
t∈N
tr(σΓ(ai)(δt)) ≤ T (75)
is fulfilled for i = 0, 1. Hence, Γ(ai)∗(σ) ∈ ST (L2(H)),
and we immediately obtain the following corollary as con-
sequence of Prop. 7:
Corollary 10 Suppose an ǫ-concealing and δ-binding
protocol with infinitely many rounds such that the ex-
pected number of rounds until commitment is uniformly
bounded for Alice playing honest as in Eq. (72). Then for
any γ > 0 there is a corresponding protocol on a priori
finite number of rounds N(γ) which is (ε+ γ)-concealing
and (δ + γ)-binding.
Thus, even protocols with an infinite number of rounds
do not admit unconditional secure bit commitment.
C. A Continuous Communication Tree
So far we have assumed that our protocol is based on
a communication tree with a discrete set of nodes and a
finite number of options or messages. In this subsection
we are going to relax this condition by allowing that the
nodes as well as the options are taken from an continuous
set. The set of time steps, however, is kept discrete. For
simplicity, we restrict the discussion to protocols with a
fixed number of rounds c until commitment. How does
the structure of a continuous communication tree look
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FIG. 3: Part of a path in a continuous communication tree.
The layer Xt belongs to Alice’s move. She sends the message
(φt+1(x), φtφt+1(x)) to Bob. The next layer is Bob’s turn,
and consists in sending the message (x,φt+1(x)) to Alice.
like? Each layer Xt that is associated with the num-
ber of the time step t is now taken to be a continuous
compact manifold. The continuous version of connect-
ing each “node” of the layer Xt to some nodes of the
following slice Xt+1 is given by a continuous surjective
map φt:Xt+1 → Xt. The pre-image φ−1t (x) ∈ Xt+1 of
a point x ∈ Xt corresponds to the nodes in Xt+1 that
are connected to x. A pair (x, φt(x)), x ∈ Xt+1, is re-
garded as a classical message that was sent from the node
φt(x) ∈ Xt and was received at the node x ∈ Xt+1.
Fig. 3 shows a part of such a continuous communication
tree. As with discrete communication trees, we asso-
ciate to each message (x, φt(x)) of the continuous tree
a message system that is given by a full matrix alge-
bra M(x, φt(x)) = B(K(x,φt(x))). Furthermore, to each
point x ∈ Xt we associate a finite dimensional full ma-
trix algebra for Alice A(x) = B(HAx ), and likewise for
Bob B(x) = B(HBx ). These algebras are defined recur-
sively: if t+ 1 is Alice’s turn, then her algebra A(x) can
be chosen arbitrarily. Bob’s algebra is defined in terms of
his previous choices of algebras and the message systems,
as follows:
B(x) :=M(x, φt(x)) ⊗ B(φt(x)) (76)
for each x ∈ Xt+1. Since Xt is continuous, we need to re-
place direct sums by bounded sections within a bundle of
observable algebras. Introducing the bundle of algebras
Et : Xt ∋ x 7→ Et(x) := A(x) ⊗ B(x) , (77)
the total system at time step t is described in terms of the
C∗-algebra C(E t) of bounded continuous sections in Et.
Alice’s subsystem C(At) is determined by the constraint
that for each A ∈ C(At) the value A(x) is contained in
the algebra A(x). In other words, A is a section in the
sub-bundle At:x 7→ A(x). Bob’s system C(Bt) is defined
in the same manner.
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For every strategy a played by Alice we hence obtain
a corresponding channel Γ(a) : C(Ec) → B(ℓ2(S)) mod-
eling all the local operations and the entire exchange of
messages up until commitment time t = c. As described
in Sec. III D, Bob’s strategies are programmed by the
choice of the initial state σ on B(ℓ2(S)). Just as before,
these channels can be decomposed into a sequence of op-
erations, each corresponding to a move made by Alice or
Bob:
Γ(a) = T(a,1) ◦ T(a,2) ◦ · · · ◦ T(a,c) . (78)
We may assume that Alice and Bob play locally coherent
strategies. Then all the channels
T(a,t) : C(Et+1)→ C(E t) (79)
in the decomposition Eq. (78) are pure. Depending on
whose turn it is, the channels T(a,t) need to respect Al-
ice’s and Bob’s subsystems: if t+1 is Alice’s move, then
T(a,t) maps Alice’s subsystem C(At+1) into Alice’s sub-
system of the previous step C(At), whereas Bob’s system
C(Xt+1,B) remains unaffected. Consequently,
T(a,t)(A)(x) ∈ A(x) and (80)
T(a,t)(B ◦ φt)(x) = B(x) (81)
for all x ∈ Xt and for all B ∈ C(Bt). Note that for each
section B ∈ C(Bt) corresponding to Bob’s system the
section
B ◦ φt : y 7→ B(φt(y)) ∈ B(φt(y)) ⊂ B(y) (82)
also belongs to Bob’s system C(Bt+1) at the preceding
step.
In complete analogy to the concealing condition for the
discrete tree, for a protocol with a continuous communi-
cation tree to be ǫ-concealing we require that∥∥ΓB(a0)− ΓB(a1)∥∥cb ≤ ǫ , (83)
where ΓB(a) is the restriction of Γ(a) to Bob’s subsystem
C(Bc). The range and domain algebras of the channels
ΓB(ai) are no longer finite dimensional matrix algebras,
nor do they admit a straightforward approximation in
terms of finite dimensional systems. Nevertheless, the
concealing condition Eq. (83) implies that Alice may find
a 2
√
ε−cheating strategy, as before. The result follows
from a generalization of the continuity theorem for Stine-
spring’s representation theorem to general C∗−algebras
[52].
V. PROTOCOLS RELYING ON
DECOHERENCE
In this Section we will demonstrate how trusted deco-
herence in Alice’s lab (Sec. VA), Bob’s lab (Sec. VB),
or in the transmission line (Sec. VC) may be employed
to design secure and fair bit commitment protocols.
A. The Trusted Coherence Shredder
A trusted third party makes perfect bit commitment
a trivial task: Alice may submit the bit to an incorrupt-
ible notary public, who will store the bit in his vault
throughout the holding phase, and later pass it on to
Bob on Alice’s notice. In this scenario, the notary public
will have to be paid for the long-term safe storage of the
bit. Clearly, Alice and Bob would get away with much
lower fees, if the notary’s presence were only required
once, and only as a witness, without even having to store
a file about the event. Such a possibility is offered by
quantum mechanics.
The basic idea is that the notary is present in Alice’s
lab until the end of the commitment phase, and sees to
it that Alice plays honest. If the honest protocols were
locally coherent, even that would be no help, since we
have seen that Alice could carry out her cheating trans-
form later, in the holding phase. However, if the honest
protocols (a0, a1) involve some measurement or other de-
coherence, the notary overseeing these actions can make
a difference. He could prevent a later cheat by taking
some part of the system with him and destroying it. In
our example below it is even sufficient for him to just
watch Alice make a measurement and, if he so chooses,
to forget about the result straight away. The protocol
is perfectly concealing, and is as binding as desired, if a
dimension parameter d is chosen large enough.
The setting requires a d-dimensional Hilbert space,
and two mutually unbiased orthonormal bases {|ej〉}j ,
{|fk〉}k, which means that 〈ej|ek〉 = 〈fj |fk〉 = δjk, and
|〈ej |fk〉|2 = 1/d, for all j, k = 1, . . . , d. While the max-
imum number of mutually unbiased bases in a Hilbert
space of given dimension d is the subject of ongoing
research, here we only need two such bases, which are
always easily constructed: starting from any given or-
thonormal basis {|ej〉}j , we may choose {|fk〉}k as the
Fourier-transformed basis,
|fk〉 := 1√
d
d∑
j=1
e
2πi
d
jk|ej〉. (84)
The protocol begins by Alice sending Bob a half of the
maximally entangled state
|Ω〉 = 1√
d
∑
j
|ej〉 ⊗ |ej〉 = 1√
d
∑
j
|fj〉 ⊗ |fj〉, (85)
where |fj〉 denotes the complex conjugate of |fj〉 with
respect to the basis |ej〉. Then, if she wants to commit the
bit value “0”, she makes a von Neumann measurement
in the basis |ej〉, and records the result. Similarly, to
commit a “1”, she makes a measurement in the basis
|fj〉. Thus, if she plays honest, as vouched for by the
notary public, she will have no quantum system left in
her lab, only the classical information about the bit value,
and her measurement result. This is the information she
sends to Bob at the opening. To verify, he will make
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a measurement in the basis |ej〉, if Alice claims to have
submitted “0”, and in the basis |fj〉 otherwise, finding
the same result as Alice with probability 1.
The protocol is perfectly concealing, since in either
case Bob gets a system in the chaotic state ρB =
1
d
1.
It is also binding, because whatever false bit value and
measurement result Alice claims, Bob will confirm this
only with probability 1/d, i.e., practically never, if d is
large.
This is essentially the bit commitment protocol orig-
inally proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [12].
Alice’s EPR attack does not work in our scenario, since
the notary public will not permit her to delay the mea-
surements until after the commitment phase. There is
also a variant of this protocol, in which the measurement
is not actually carried out. In that case Alice prepares
one of the mixed states
ρ0 =
1
d
∑
j
|ej ⊗ ej〉〈ej ⊗ ej |, (86)
ρ1 =
1
d
∑
j
|fj ⊗ fj〉〈fj ⊗ fj |, (87)
for committing “0” or “1”, respectively. Now the notary
watching her will see to it that she actually prepares these
mixed states, and not their purifications. For verification
Bob uses the support projections P0,1 = d · ρ0,1.
Once again, the protocol is perfectly concealing. Let
us analyze Alice’s cheating options, after she prepared
ρ0, with the trusted notary watching and then leaving.
If she wants to change her commitment to “1”, she can
only employ some local channel T ⊗ id and hope to pass
Bob’s test with the projection P1. The probability for
this is
tr ρ0 (T ⊗ id )(P1)
=
1
d
d∑
k,j=1
〈ej , ej|(T ⊗ id )(|fk, fk〉〈fk, fk|)|ej , ej〉
=
1
d
d∑
k,j=1
∣∣〈ej |fk〉∣∣2 〈ej |T (|fk〉〈fk|)|ej〉
=
1
d2
d∑
k,j=1
〈ej |T (|fk〉〈fk|)|ej〉
=
1
d2
d∑
j=1
〈ej |T (1)|ej〉
=
1
d
. (88)
The same computation applies to trρ1(T ⊗ id )(P0), so
Alice’s success probability is 1/d, independently of her
cheating channel, and may hence be chosen to be arbi-
trarily small.
B. A Decoherence Monster in Bob’s Lab
In the proof of Th. 4 we have shown that Alice has
a cheating strategy for any concealing protocol. Hence
it is not surprising that by weakening Alice’s position,
namely when decoherence eliminates her favorite cheat-
ing option, bit commitment protocols like those described
in the previous section become possible. But it may seem
rather paradoxical that decoherence acting on Bob’s side,
presumably further hampering the weaker partner, can
also lead to successful protocols.
Suppose that every morning, the cleaning service
comes to Bob’s lab, unplugs all vacuum pumps, and re-
stores what they take for tidiness. Only classical records
survive this procedure. When Alice is convinced that
she can rely on this, she might reassess her demands on
concealment, and the two might agree on a bit commit-
ment protocol, which under such circumstances is indeed
both concealing and binding. This example shows very
clearly that the entangled record introduced in the proof
is essential.
The protocol we suggest relies on the distinction be-
tween the local erasure of information and the destruc-
tion of quantum correlations, as seen in a pair of channels
demonstrating the separation between ordinary operator
norm and cb-norm in an extreme way [55]:
Lemma 11 Let ε, δ > 0. Then for sufficiently large d
there is a pair of channels R,S : B(Cd) → B(Cd) such
that ‖R− S‖ ≤ ε and ‖R− S‖cb ≥ 2− δ.
Since standard operator norm and cb-norm coincide
for channels with classical (Abelian) output space
(cf. Th. 3.9 in Paulsen’s text [56]), Lemma 11 demon-
strates a purely quantum-mechanical effect.
Proof of Lemma 11: According to Ref. [55], a
quantum channel R:B(Cd)→ B(Cd) is ε-randomizing iff
‖R∗(̺)− S∗(̺)‖1 ≤ ε ∀ ̺ ∈ B∗(Cd), (89)
where S denotes the completely depolarizing channel,
S(e) =
1
d
tr e ⇐⇒ S∗(̺) = trρ
d
1 (90)
for all e ∈ B(Cd) and ̺ ∈ B∗(Cd), respectively. Eq. (89)
implies the norm estimate ‖R− S‖ ≤ ε, as required in
Lemma 11.
Hayden et al. show that for d > 10
ε
, such an ǫ-
randomizing quantum channel can be obtained with high
probability from a random selection of at most µ :=
⌈ 134
ε2
d log d⌉ unitary operators {Ui}µi=1 ⊂ B(Cd),
R(e) :=
1
µ
µ∑
i=1
U∗i e Ui. (91)
In striking contrast, exact randomization of quantum
states (such that ε = 0 in Eq. (89)) is known to require
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an ancilla system of dimension d2 ≫ µ [57]. However,
this significant reduction in the size of the ancilla space
comes at a price: while the randomizing map R erases
local information, it preserves almost all the correlations
with a bystander system if d is sufficiently large. In fact,
it is straightforward to show the upper bound
‖(R∗ − S∗)⊗ id |Ω〉〈Ω|‖1 ≥ 2− 2µ
d2
, (92)
where |Ω〉 := 1√
d
∑d
i=1 |i, i〉 again denotes the maximally
entangled state on Cd ⊗ Cd. Eq. (92) implies the bound
‖R− S‖cb ≥ 2 − δ, where δ := 2µd2 can be made as small
as desired by choosing d sufficiently large. 
We can now set up a bit commitment protocol in
which Bob initially supplies a pure state |ψ〉 on a d-
dimensional Hilbert space HB according to the unitarily
invariant Haar measure. There is only one round for
Alice, requiring her to send back a system with the same
Hilbert space. Her honest strategies are specified by a
pair of channels Tk : B(HkA ⊗HB) → B(HB) (k = 0, 1).
We take them to be locally coherent, i.e., implemented
by a single isometry Vk : HB → HkA ⊗ HB each. Their
restrictions to Bob’s side will be channels as provided
by Lemma 11: TB0 (X) = V
∗
0 (1 ⊗ X)V0 = R(X) and,
similarly, TB1 = S.
To reveal her commitment, Alice will later supply Bob
with the ancilla system HkA, alongside with the bit value
k. Bob will then verify Alice’s claim with a projective
measurement on Vk|ψ〉, as illustrated in Fig. 4. Clearly,
this protocol is perfectly sound, since Bob’s measurement
will confirm the bit value k with unit probability if both
parties have followed their honest strategies. The proto-
col is ε2 -concealing, provided the Decoherence Monster
strikes as planned, implementing some entanglement-
breaking channel [58] on Bob’s reference system. By def-
inition, these are the channels D:B(HB)→ B(HB) such
that D⊗ id (̺) is separable for any input state ̺. Hence,
these channels are sometimes also called separable. In
Fig. 4, the decoherence inflicted by D is indicated by the
rubbish bin. We will show below that the maximal prob-
ability difference Bob can detect by preparing suitable
states and making suitable measurements is then indeed
just ‖R− S‖ /2.
To see that the protocol is binding note first, that Al-
ice’s usual cheating strategy cannot work: If there were
an operator U such that (U⊗1)V0 ≈ V1 in norm, the two
channels R and S could immediately be estimated to be
cb-norm close, in contradiction to the second property
guaranteed by Lemma 11.
However, it is clearly not enough to argue that there
is no universal cheating strategy for Alice, which suc-
ceeds regardless of Bob’s input state. We need to rule
out strategies which would allow Alice to fool Bob’s test
in many cases, or with high probability. In addition, we
also have to show security for arbitrary cheating strate-
gies and, in particular, we have to make certain that the
reduction of Bob’s lab capabilities by the Decoherence
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FIG. 4: A quantum bit commitment protocol with local de-
coherence in Bob’s lab. The rubbish bin symbolizes an
entanglement-breaking channel acting on Bob’s reference sys-
tem. The figure shows the flow of quantum (solid) and clas-
sical (dashed) information if both Alice and Bob play honest.
Alice controls all systems on the left-hand side of the figure,
Bob those on the right-hand side. Time flows upwards. The
protocol starts with Bob submitting some pure quantum state
|ψ〉 ∈ Cd to Alice, and ends with Bob’s measurement M .
Monster does not also give Alice a bit more freedom to
cheat. That is, in order to prove security we have to
explain why the coherent record makes a difference for
Bob’s ability to distinguish the honest strategies, but not
for his ability to distinguish honest from cheating strate-
gies in the opening phase. This is the essence of the
following
Theorem 12 Let ε > 0, δ > 0. Then for sufficiently
large dimension d the bit commitment protocol described
above is perfectly sound, ε-concealing, and δ-binding.
In the proof of Th. 12 we will need to employ some of
the standard properties of distance measures for quantum
states and operations, which we collect here for reference.
We start with the well-known equivalence of the trace-
norm distance and the fidelity:
Lemma 13 Let F (̺, σ) := tr
√√
̺σ
√
̺ denote the fi-
delity of two quantum states ̺, σ ∈ B∗(H). We then
have:
1− F (̺, σ) ≤ 1
2
‖̺− σ‖1 ≤
√
1− F 2(̺, σ). (93)
A proof of Lemma 13 can be found in Ch. 9.2 of [21].
The fidelity F (̺, σ) = tr
√√
̺ σ
√
̺ is symmetric in its
inputs and unitarily invariant. It never decreases un-
der quantum operations. If ̺ = |ϕ〉〈ϕ| is pure, we have
F (ϕ, σ) =
√
〈ϕ|σ|ϕ〉. We will also need the following
lemma, which appears as Lemma 2 in [23]:
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Lemma 14 For any two quantum states ̺, σ ∈ B∗(H)
we have:
sup
ω∈B∗(H)
{
F 2(̺, ω) + F 2(σ, ω)
}
= 1 + F (̺, σ). (94)
We now proceed from quantum states to quantum op-
erations: The channel fidelity of a quantum channel
T :B(Cd)→ B(Cd) is defined as
Fc(T ) := F
2
(
Ω, T ⊗ id (|Ω〉〈Ω|)) = 〈Ω|T ⊗ id (|Ω〉〈Ω|)|Ω〉,
(95)
where |Ω〉 = 1√
d
∑d
j=1 |j〉 ⊗ |j〉 is maximally entangled
on Cd ⊗ Cd, as before. The channel fidelity Fc(T ) is a
measure for the quantum channel T to preserve entan-
glement with a bystander system, and is closely related
to the average fidelity of the channel T ,
F (T ) :=
∫
〈ψ|T (|ψ〉〈ψ|)|ψ〉 dψ, (96)
where the integral is over the normalized Haar measure:
Lemma 15 For any quantum channel T :B(Cd) →
B(Cd), we have:
F (T ) ≥ Fc(T ) ≥ F (T )− 1
d
. (97)
The proof of Lemma 15 is immediate from the relation
[59, 60]
F (T ) =
dFc(T ) + 1
d+ 1
.  (98)
In the protocol described above we grant the Decoherence
Monster the freedom to apply an arbitrary entanglement-
breaking quantum channel on Bob’s bystander system.
Any such channel D:B(HB) → B(HB) can be decom-
posed [58] as D = D1 ◦D2, where
D1: CX → B(HB) and (99)
D2: B(HB)→ CX , (100)
and CX denotes the Abelian algebra of the complex-
valued functions on the finite set X (with |X | elements).
In other words, any entanglement-breaking channel can
be thought of as being built from a measurement channel
D1, with resulting classical output system CX , followed
by a re-preparation D2. (Note that Eqs. (99) and (100)
describe the channels Dk in the Heisenberg picture, so
the direction of arrows is inverted, cf. Sec. VIIA.)
In order to confirm ε-concealment of the monster pro-
tocol, we will need to show that any such entanglement-
breaking channel D renders Bob’s bystander system use-
less for the analysis of Alice’s actions:
Lemma 16 For any linear map L:B(H) → B(K) and
any entanglement-breaking channel D:B(H1)→ B(K1),
‖L⊗D‖ = ‖L‖ . (101)
Since entanglement-breaking channels have a decompo-
sition D1 ◦D2 with an intermediate classical system CX ,
it will turn out sufficient to verify this property for the
noiseless classical channel idX :
Lemma 17 For any linear map L:B(H) → B(K) and
any classical observable algebra CX ,
‖L ⊗ idX‖ = ‖L‖ . (102)
Proof of Lemma 17: For any a ∈ B(H) we have,
‖L(a)‖ = ‖L ⊗ idX (a ⊗ 1X)‖ ≤ ‖L ⊗ idX‖ ‖a‖ ,
(103)
which shows that ‖L‖ ≤ ‖L ⊗ idX‖.
For the converse implication, note that any classical-
quantum state ̺ on B(K)⊗ CX is of the form
̺ =
|X|∑
x=1
px ̺x ⊗ |x〉〈x|, (104)
where {px}|X|x=1 is a classical probability distribution,
{̺x}|X|x=1 is a set of quantum states on B(K), and {|x〉}|X|x=1
denotes an orthonormal basis for C|X| (cf. Prop. 2.2.4 in
[61]). We may now estimate,
‖(L∗ ⊗ idX)̺‖1 ≤
|X|∑
x=1
px ‖L∗(̺x)⊗ |x〉〈x|‖1
=
|X|∑
x=1
px ‖L∗(̺x)‖1
≤
|X|∑
x=1
px ‖L‖ = ‖L‖ ,
(105)
and hence ‖L ⊗ idX‖ ≤ ‖L‖, as claimed. 
Proof of Lemma 16: Choosing a ∈ B(H), we
immediately have
‖L(a)‖ = ‖L(a)⊗ 1K1‖
= ‖(L⊗D) (a⊗ 1H1)‖
≤ ‖L⊗D‖ ‖a⊗ 1H1‖
= ‖L⊗D‖ ‖a‖ ,
(106)
implying ‖L‖ ≤ ‖L⊗D‖.
For the converse implication, let D = D1 ◦ D2 be a
decomposition as in Eqs. (99) and (100) above. We may
then estimate,
‖L⊗D‖ = ‖L⊗ (D1 ◦D2)‖
= ‖(idK ⊗D1) (L ⊗ idX) (idH ⊗D2)‖
≤ ‖idK ⊗D1‖ ‖L⊗ idX‖ ‖idH ⊗D2‖
≤ ‖D1‖cb ‖L⊗ idX‖ ‖D2‖cb = ‖L‖ ,
(107)
where in the last step we have used Lemma 17 and the
fact that ‖T ‖cb = 1 for any channel T (cf. Sec. VII C).
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
We now have all the tools at hand to complete
the
Proof of Th. 12: Soundness of the protocol is
clear. Setting L := R − S in Lemma 16, ε-concealment
follows immediately from Lemma 11.
Thus, it only remains to show that the protocol is δ-
binding. As a warm-up exercise, let us first exclude the
possibility of Alice committing to the bit value k in the
commitment phase, and then announcing the bit 1 − k
in the opening phase. This is sometimes called passive
cheating.
If Bob has initially supplied the pure state |ψ〉 ∈ Cd,
the probability of successfully passing Bob’s projective
measurement in such a scenario is P (ψ) := |〈V0ψ|V1ψ〉|2,
resulting in the overall cheating probability
P :=
∫
P (ψ) dψ
=
∫
〈ψ|V ∗0 V1(|ψ〉〈ψ|)V ∗1 V0|ψ〉 dψ
(96)
= F (V ∗0 V1). (108)
For δ and d as in Lemma 11, we then have the estimate
2− δ
(92)
≤ ‖TB0∗ ⊗ id (|Ω〉〈Ω|) − TB1∗ ⊗ id (|Ω〉〈Ω|)‖1
≤ ‖(V0 ⊗ 1)|Ω〉〈Ω|(V ∗0 ⊗ 1)
−(V1 ⊗ 1)|Ω〉〈Ω|(V ∗1 ⊗ 1)‖1
(93)
≤ 2
√
1− F 2(V0 ⊗ 1|Ω〉, V1 ⊗ 1|Ω〉)
(95)
= 2
√
1− Fc(V ∗0 V1)
(97)
≤ 2
√
1− F (V ∗0 V1) +
1
d
(108)
= 2
√
1− P + 1
d
, (109)
where in the second step we have used that the trace-
norm cannot increase under the partial trace operation
[21]. From Eq. (109) we conclude that
P ≤ 1
d
+ δ. (110)
Since the right side of Eq. (110) can be made as small
as desired by stepping up the dimension, this gives the
desired upper bound on Alice’s probability of successfully
passing Bob’s test.
So far we have only proven bindingness against passive
cheating attacks. As illustrated in Fig. 5, Alice’s most
general attack consists of applying some quantum chan-
nel T ♯:B(H♯)⊗B(HB)→ B(HB) during the commitment
phase, independently of the bit value k ∈ {0, 1}. She
will send a d-dimensional quantum system HB to Bob
without having committed to either bit. Only before the
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FIG. 5: Alice’s cheating strategy consists of applying some
quantum channel T ♯ in the commitment phase, and then an-
other quantum channel T ♯k to commit to the bit value k ∈
{0, 1} only before the opening. Her goal is to pass Bob’s pro-
jective measurement M .
opening will she then decide on a bit value k, apply a
corresponding quantum channel T ♯k:B(HkA) → B(H♯) on
her remaining system, and hope to pass Bob’s projective
measurement.
Assuming that Alice is a not prejudiced towards either
bit, the probability of passing Bob’s test is then P :=
1
2P0 +
1
2P1, where for k ∈ {0, 1} we set
Pk :=
∫
〈Vkψ|(T ♯k∗ ⊗ idB)T ♯∗(|ψ〉〈ψ|)|Vkψ〉 dψ. (111)
This probability can be bounded as follows:
Pk =
∫
〈ψ|V ∗k (T ♯k∗ ⊗ idB)T ♯∗(|ψ〉〈ψ|)Vk |ψ〉 dψ
(96)
= F
(
V ∗k (T
♯
k∗ ⊗ idB)T ♯∗Vk
)
(97)
≤ Fc
(
V ∗k (T
♯
k∗ ⊗ idB)T ♯∗Vk
)
+
1
d
(112)
(95)
= F 2
(
Vk ⊗ 1B′ |Ω〉, (T ♯k∗ ⊗ idB ⊗ idB′)
(T ♯∗ ⊗ idB′)(|Ω〉〈Ω|)
)
+
1
d
≤ F 2(TBk∗ ⊗ idB′(|Ω〉〈Ω|),
trH♯T
♯
∗ ⊗ idB′(|Ω〉〈Ω|)
)
+
1
d
,
where in the final step we have used the monotonicity
of the fidelity under the partial trace operation. Com-
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bining this estimate with Lemma 14 and Eq. (92) then
immediately yields the bound
P ≤ 1
2
+
1
d
+
1
2
F
(
R⊗ idB′(|Ω〉〈Ω|), S ⊗ idB′(|Ω〉〈Ω|)
)
≤ 1
2
+
1
d
+
1
2
√
δ. (113)
The right-hand side can be brought as close to 12 as
desired by stepping up the dimension. Resubstituting
1
d
+ 12
√
δ 7→ δ, the protocol is δ-binding. This concludes
the proof of Th. 12. 
C. Decoherence in the Transmission Line
While noise in the transmission line is generally consid-
ered a nuisance, and coding theorists have designed elab-
orate error correcting codes to cope with it, Wyner [62]
was the first to realize that noise may sometimes be bene-
ficial for cryptographic applications — in his case for key
distribution. Cre´peau and Kilian [63] have later shown
that classical noisy channels may also be employed to
establish secure bit commitment. Their results have sub-
sequently been improved in [64, 65]. Recently Winter et
al. [66] have considered the asymptotic version of string
commitment and have obtained a single-letter expression
for the commitment capacity of a classical noisy channel.
Their results show that any nontrivial noisy channel can
be used to establish secure bit commitment. The theorem
can be extended to so-called classical-quantum channels.
But it remains an open question whether fully quantum
channels can also be useful for bit commitment.
Misaligned spatial reference frames can also effectively
act as a noisy channel, and facilitate secure bit commit-
ment. An example for a secure protocol was recently
given by Harrow et al. [67].
VI. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In summary, we have presented a general frame-
work for two-party cryptographic protocols and have
shown that secure quantum bit commitment is impos-
sible within that framework — by giving explicit bounds
on the degree of concealment and bindingness that can
be simultaneously achieved in any given protocol. Our
proof covers protocols on finite or infinite dimensional
Hilbert spaces with any number of rounds in each of the
commitment, holding, and opening phases. In contrast to
earlier proofs, we do not assume the receiver to be bound
to a publicly known strategy. Thus, our strengthened no-
go result also covers the anonymous state protocols that
have been repeatedly suggested as a way to circumvent
the standard no go arguments. If the receiver’s strategy is
fixed and common knowledge, our bounds coincide with
those obtained by Spekkens and Rudolph [23], and hence
the standard no-go proof is recovered in that case.
Our formulation of the no-go proof contains an explicit
treatment of the classical information flow, possibly of in-
dependent interest for other cryptographic applications.
As a consequence, the framework directly applies to the
purely classical setting, in which no quantum informa-
tion is exchanged and all local Hilbert spaces are one-
dimensional. Note however, that in order to cheat with a
sneak flip operation as described in the proof of Th. 4, in
general Alice will nevertheless need to apply a quantum
operation. This is so because the commutant of Bob’s
classical system is usually a hybrid containing both clas-
sical and quantum parts. Hence, a classical protocol em-
bedded in a quantum world allows Alice to cheat, but the
fully classical no-go proof is not directly recovered.
We emphasize that in our setup, Alice and Bob may
draw on an unlimited supply of certified classical or quan-
tum correlations, in the form of an arbitrary shared ini-
tial state ρ0, and yet secure quantum bit commitment
remains impossible. This is in striking contrast to quan-
tum coin tossing: starting with a maximally entangled
qubit state and measuring in a fixed basis, Alice and
Bob can obviously implement a perfectly fair and secure
coin tossing protocol3.
In the second part of the paper, we have analyzed
quantum bit commitment protocols relying on decoher-
ence. We have presented a new such protocol in which
provably secure bit commitment is guaranteed through
an entanglement-breaking channel in the receiver’s lab.
The protocol relies on the separation between local era-
sure of information and the destruction of correlations,
which is a purely quantum mechanical effect.
In accordance with most of the literature, throughout
this work we have restricted the discussion to quantum
bit commitment protocols in which concealment is guar-
anteed for all branches of the communication tree. This
is sometimes called strong bit commitment, in order to
distinguish it from a weaker form in which Bob may pos-
sibly learn the value of the bit — as long as Alice receives
a message stating that the bit value has been disclosed.
Weak bit commitment protocols have been analyzed by
Hardy and Kent [30], and independently by Aharonov
et al. [31]. Such protocols are sufficient whenever bit
commitment is only part of a larger cryptographic en-
vironment, and the value of the bit itself does not re-
veal any useful information. In particular, secure weak
bit commitment protocols could be applied to implement
quantum coin tossing. However, weak bit commitment is
likewise impossible, with identical bounds on the con-
cealment and bindingness. The no-go proof follows our
analysis for strong bit commitment in this paper, but the
concealment condition now only has to be guaranteed for
a subtree, and hence for a subchannel. Alice then finds a
sneak flip operation from a version of Stinespring’s conti-
nuity theorem for subnormalized quantum channels [52].
3 We would like to thank the referee for clarifying this point.
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VII. APPENDIX: LANGUAGE AND
NOTATIONS
This appendix contains the necessary background on
observables, states and quantum channels, as well as on
direct sums and their role for the description of alge-
braically encoded classical information. We restrict the
discussion to the basics, and refer to the textbook of
Bratteli and Robinson [68] and Keyl’s survey article [61]
for a more complete presentation.
A. Observables, States, and Quantum Channels
The statistical properties of quantum systems are
characterized by spaces of operators on a Hilbert space
H: The observables of the system are given by bounded
linear operators on H, written B(H). This is the proto-
type of a C∗-algebra and is usually called the observable
algebra of the system. The physical states are then those
positive linear functionals ω:B(H) → C that satisfy
the normalization condition ω(1) = 1. We restrict
our discussion to finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, for
which all linear operators are bounded and every linear
functional ω can be expressed in terms of a trace-class
operator ̺ω ∈ B∗(H) such that ω(A) = tr̺ωA for all
A ∈ B(H). The normalization of the functional ω than
translates into the condition tr̺ω = 1. The physical
states can thus be identified with the set of normalized
density operators ̺ ∈ B∗(H).
A quantum channel T which transforms input systems
described by a Hilbert space HA into output systems
described by a (possibly different) Hilbert space HB is
represented (in the Heisenberg picture) by a completely
positive and unital map T :B(HB)→ B(HA). By unital-
ity we mean that T (1B) = 1A, with the identity operator
1X ∈ B(HX). Complete positivity means that id ν ⊗ T
is positive for all ν ∈ N, where id ν denotes the identity
operation on the (ν × ν) matrices.
The physical interpretation of the quantum channel T
is the following: when the system is initially in the state
̺ ∈ B∗(HA), the expectation value of the measurement of
the observableB ∈ B(HB) at the output side of the chan-
nel is given in terms of T by tr ̺ T (B). Unitality provides
the normalization, while complete positivity guarantees
that all expectation values remain positive even if the
channel is only part of a larger network.
Alternatively, we can focus on the dynamics of the
states and introduce the dual map T∗:B∗(HA)→ B∗(HB)
by means of the duality relation
trT∗(̺)B = tr̺ T (B) ∀ ̺ ∈ B∗(HA), B ∈ B(HB).
(114)
T∗ is a completely positive and trace-preserving map
and represents the channel in the Schro¨dinger picture,
while T provides the Heisenberg picture representation.
For finite-dimensional systems, the Schro¨dinger and the
Heisenberg picture provide a completely equivalent de-
scription of physical processes. The interconversion is
always immediate from Eq. (114).
B. Direct Sums and Quantum-Classical Hybrid
Systems
Our general description of bit commitment protocols
includes a full treatment of the classical and quantum in-
formation flow. As explained in Section II B, the nodes of
the communication tree correspond to the classical infor-
mation accumulated in the course of the protocol. Direct
sums are a convenient way to encode this information in
the observable algebras: For a finite collection of observ-
able algebras {Ax}x∈X , the direct sum algebra
X⊕
x=1
Ax := {
X⊕
x=1
Ax | Ax ∈ Ax} (115)
represents the physical situation in which the system un-
der consideration is described by an observable algebra
Ax if the classical information x ∈ X has been accu-
mulated. Sums and products as well as adjoints in this
algebra are defined component-wise, i. e.,⊕
x
Ax +
⊕
x
Bx :=
⊕
x
(
Ax +Bx
)
(116)⊕
x
Ax ·
⊕
x
Bx :=
⊕
x
(
Ax ·Bx
)
(117)
α ·
⊕
x
Ax :=
⊕
x
(
α · Ax
)
(118)
(⊕
x
Ax
)∗
:=
⊕
x
A∗x (119)
for all operators Ax, Bx ∈ Ax, and coefficients α ∈ C.
It is straightforward to verify that with these definitions
⊕xAx is indeed an algebra with identity 1 = ⊕x1x, where
for each x ∈ X 1x denotes the identity in Ax. The norm
on ⊕xAx is given by
‖⊕xAx‖ := max
x∈X
‖Ax‖ . (120)
If Ax = B(Hx) for a collection of Hilbert spaces
{Hx}Xx=1, then ⊕xB(Hx) ⊂ B
( ⊕x Hx). The physical
states on such a system are of the form ⊕xpx̺x, where
̺x ∈ B∗(Hx) are states on the component algebras and
{px}Xx=1 is a classical probability distribution.
As explained in Section II B, in our formulation of the
bit commitment protocol the component algebrasAx will
usually be tensor products of observable algebras in Al-
ice’s and Bob’s lab, respectively: Ax = Ax(a) ⊗ Bx(b).
The local algebras Ax(a) and Bx(b) could be full ma-
trix algebras, or could themselves be direct sums, rep-
resenting local classical information available to Alice
or Bob exclusively. The strategic operations that are
performed by Alice and Bob are described by channels
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acting on these direct sum algebras. In the Heisenberg
picture, these channels are completely positive unital
maps T : A → B(H) with A = ⊕xAx. Their inter-
pretation is easily seen from Stinespring’s representation
(Prop. 1): There exists a Hilbert space K, an isometry
V :H → K as well as a representation π of A such that
T (A) = V ∗π(A)V holds. For each x ∈ X , the identity
operator of the direct summand Ax is a projection Px
in A that commutes with all operators in A. These pro-
jections generate an abelian subalgebra C(A) called the
center of A. Since π is a *-representation and therefore
respects the product of operators, π(Px) projects onto
the subspace π(Px)K =: Kx, which is invariant under
the action of all represented operators π(A). Hence we
obtain for every x a representation of A on Kx according
to
πx(A) := π(Px)π(A)π(Px) = π(A)π(Px). (121)
Since each direct summand Ax = B(Hx) is a full matrix
algebra, the Hilbert spaces Kx can be chosen to be of the
form Kx = Hx⊗Mx with appropriate multiplicity spaces
Mx. The representation πx is then given by πx(⊕xAx) =
Ax⊗1Mx . In terms of the representations πx, the action
of the channel T on an operator A can be written as
T (A) =
∑
x∈X
V ∗πx(A)V . (122)
How is this kind of representation interpreted in op-
erational terms? We first have a look at measurement
operations in the Heisenberg picture. Usually a measure-
ment operation is described by a positive operator valued
measure (POVM), i.e., a collection
{Mx ∈ B(K) | 0 ≤Mx ≤ 1,
∑
xMx = 1} . (123)
The set X is interpreted as the set of possible measure-
ment outcomes. In the Heisenberg picture, this corre-
sponds to a completely positive normalized map M from
the abelian algebra ⊕xC = CX into B(K). Namely,
the operator f ∈ CX is mapped to M(f) = ∑xMxfx.
Hence, measurement operations are a special class of
channels on direct sum algebras, where each summand
is chosen to be one-dimensional, Ax = C. Thus, if we
restrict the channel T to the center C(A), which is iso-
morphic to CX , then we obtain a measurement operation
whose corresponding POVM is given by the operators
{V ∗π(Px)V |x ∈ X}. To verify this, we evaluate T on a
central element C ∈ C(A),
T (C) = T
(∑
x
CxPx
)
=
∑
x
V ∗π(Px)V Cx , (124)
where central elements C are expressed as linear combi-
nations of the projections Px, i.e., C =
∑
x CxPx with
Cx ∈ C. This justifies the following interpretation: The
quantum system under investigation is described by the
observable algebra Ax if the measurement results in the
outcome x ∈ X . In other words, the direct sum op-
eration can be seen as a “logical XOR” composition of
quantum systems — in contrast to the tensor product,
which corresponds to the “logical AND”.
Coming back to the bit commitment protocol, the
nodes of the communication tree then in fact have a natu-
ral interpretation as outcomes of a measurement process
returning a history of communicated decisions, which are
given by the unique path in the tree starting at its root
and ending at x ∈ X .
C. Distance Measures
In order to evaluate the concealment and bindingness
conditions in a quantum bit commitment protocol we
need to measure the distance between two quantum chan-
nels or two quantum states: Assume two channels T1 and
T2 with common input and output algebras A and B,
respectively. Since these Ti are (in Heisenberg picture)
operators between normed spaces B and A, the natural
choice to quantify their distance is the operator norm,
‖T1 − T2‖ := sup
B 6=0
‖T1(B)− T2(B)‖
‖B‖ . (125)
The norm distance Eq. (125) has a neat operational char-
acterization: it is twice the largest difference between the
overall probabilities in two statistical quantum experi-
ments differing only in replacing one use of T1 with one
use of T2.
However, we also want to allow for more general ex-
periments, in which the two channels are only applied
to a sub-system of a larger system. This requires stabi-
lized distance measures [69], and naturally leads to the
so-called norm of complete boundedness (or cb-norm, for
short) [56]:
‖T1 − T2‖cb := sup
ν∈N
‖id ν ⊗ (T1 − T2)‖ , (126)
where id ν again denotes the ideal (or noiseless) chan-
nel on the (ν × ν)-matrices. Useful properties of the
cb-norm include multiplicativity, i. e., ‖T1 ⊗ T2‖cb =
‖T1‖cb ‖T2‖cb, and unitality: ‖T ‖cb = 1 for any chan-
nel T .
Obviously, ‖T ‖cb ≥ ‖T ‖ for every linear map T . If
either the input or output space is a classical system,
we even have equality: ‖T ‖cb = ‖T ‖ (cf. Ch. 3 in [56]).
Fully quantum systems generically show a separation
between these two norms.
States are channels with one-dimensional input space,
C. Since this is a classical system, there is no need to dis-
tinguish between stabilized and non-stabilized distance
measures. The so-called trace norm ‖̺‖1 = tr
√
̺∗̺ is
frequently employed to evaluate the distance between two
density operators. The trace norm difference ‖̺ − σ‖1
is equivalent to the fidelity F (̺, σ) := tr
√√
̺ σ
√
̺ (cf.
Lemma 13).
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For any linear operator T the operator norm ‖T ‖
equals the norm of the Schro¨dinger adjoint T∗ on the
space of trace class operators, i. e.,
‖T‖ = sup
‖̺‖1≤1
‖T∗(̺)‖1 (127)
(cf. Ch. VI of [53] and Section 2.4 of [68] for de-
tails), which is the usual way to convert norm estimates
from the Heisenberg picture into the Schro¨dinger pic-
ture and vice versa. For states T∗ = ̺, the operator
norm then indeed just coincides with the trace norm:
‖T ‖ = ‖T∗‖1 = ‖̺‖1.
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